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Abstract
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investors are ex-ante heterogeneous, trading costs reduce (increase) price informativeness if and only
if investors who disproportionately trade on information are more (less) elastic than investors who
mostly trade on hedging. Through a reduction in information acquisition, trading costs reduce price
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1 Introduction
Technological advances have dramatically reduced the cost of trading in financial markets. However,
has this reduction in trading costs made financial markets better at aggregating information? Has the
ability to trade more cheaply encouraged information acquisition in financial markets? More broadly,
what are the implications of changes in trading costs for the aggregation and generation of information
in financial markets? In this paper, we seek to provide an answer to these questions by systematically
studying the implications of trading costs for information aggregation and information acquisition in
financial markets.
In our model, investors trade for two reasons. They trade on private information, after receiving a
private signal about asset payoffs, and due to a privately known hedging demand, which is stochastic and
uncertain in the aggregate. The combination of trading based on private information and the aggregate
uncertainty in hedging motives makes prices only partially informative. This forces investors – or any
interested external observer – to solve a filtering problem to recover the information about asset payoffs
aggregated by asset prices. Using this framework as the core building block, in the spirit of Modigliani
and Miller (1958), we structure our paper around several irrelevance results that emerge in different
canonical models of financial trading.
Our first main result is an irrelevance theorem that applies to competitive economies with ex-ante
identical investors. We show that, for a given precision of investors’ private signals, price informativeness
is independent of the level of trading costs. The logic behind our main result is elementary and intuitive.
The effect of trading costs on how prices aggregate information is a function of how the relevant signal-
to-noise ratio contained in asset prices is affected. For example, an increase in trading costs necessarily
reduces the amount of trading due to information motives, reducing the informational content of prices.
However, this same increase in trading costs also reduces trading due to hedging needs, reducing the
noise component of asset prices. When investors are ex-ante identical, the ratio of these trading motives
– which becomes the relevant signal-to-noise ratio of the economy – remains constant as trading costs
change. This is the logic that underlies our irrelevance results.
Our second set of results illustrates how specific forms of heterogeneity break our irrelevance result.
We show that only when investors who disproportionally trade on information are more price sensitive
than investors who disproportionally trade for hedging reasons, do we expect prices to become less
informative when trading costs are higher and vice versa. Formally, we allow for heterogeneity in the
precision of the private signals about the fundamental, in the variance of hedging needs, and in investors’
risk aversion. First, we show that all three sources of heterogeneity, in isolation, are associated with a
reduction in price informativeness when trading costs increase. This result arises because investors with
more precise information, either about the fundamental or the aggregate hedging, or with relatively high
risk tolerance, trade more aggressively in general and react more to trading costs, while putting more
weight on their private signal about the fundamental and contributing relatively more information to the
price. Next, we formally establish that for most combinations of two-dimensional heterogeneity across
the three sources of heterogeneity that we consider, an increase in trading costs is associated with a
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reduction in price informativeness. Intuitively, only very specific forms of two-dimensional heterogeneity
are able to overturn the one-dimensional result. Finally, we provide a characterization of the effect of
trading costs on price informativeness in terms of demand sensitivities to private signals and hedging
needs that applies to multidimensional forms of heterogeneity. This characterization illustrates the
intuition behind the economic mechanisms that drive the results.
Since our model with heterogeneous investors nests the classic noise trading formulation, we are able
to highlight the importance of how economic “noise” is modeled when studying information aggregation.1
Classic noise trading, as in Grossman and Stiglitz (1980), is often modeled as an exogenous stochastic
demand or supply shock and it is often justified as standing in for hedging needs of unmodeled traders.
Although a classic noise trading formulation may be a useful shortcut at times, it is not satisfactory
when we seek to understand the effects of trading costs on price informativeness: it is silent on how noise
traders react to changes in the level of trading costs, a form of Lucas (1976) Critique.
Subsequently, we allow investors to choose the precision of their private signal about the fundamental.
In our benchmark model with ex-ante identical investors, we show that an increase in trading costs
endogenously reduces the precision of the signal about the fundamental chosen by investors. Intuitively,
high trading costs make it harder for a given investor to profit from acquiring private information. Since
the investors anticipate that they will be able to profit less from having better information, they choose
less precise signals, which reduces equilibrium price informativeness.2 We can draw two conclusions from
this exercise. First, trading costs have sharply different implications for information aggregation and
information acquisition. Second, trading costs tend to reduce the endogenous precision of signals about
the fundamental, decreasing equilibrium price informativeness.
We return to the benchmark model without information acquisition and show that our irrelevance
theorem extends to economies with a) alternative forms of trading costs, b) random heterogeneous priors
as a source of aggregate uncertainty, and c) strategic investors. First, we show that our irrelevance result
continues to hold when investors face linear trading costs or fixed trading costs, instead of quadratic,
the sustained assumption in most of the paper. Second, we allow investors to have stochastic privately
known heterogeneous priors, which are random in the aggregate. This shows that our irrelevance result
is robust to having other sources of aggregate uncertainty, in addition to hedging. Third, we show
that changes in trading costs in economies in which investors’ strategic behavior matters (for instance,
when there is a finite number of investors) do not affect the level of price informativeness. Strategic
behavior changes the trading sensitivities of investors, but it does so symmetrically. Therefore, the logic
underlying the results in the competitive model with a continuum of investors still applies.
1A consequence of modeling aggregate noise from first principles is that our model features multiple equilibria. Our
formulation, similar but not identical to the one used in Ganguli and Yang (2009) and Manzano and Vives (2011), who also
find multiple equilibria, guarantees equilibrium existence for any set of primitives. Note that our irrelevance result remains
valid under their formulation.
2In the Online Appendix, we extend the model by allowing investors to choose the precision of a private signal about
the aggregate hedging need (noise). We show that investors also choose less precise signals about the noise when they face
higher trading costs. Less precise signals on the noise also reduce the equilibrium level of price informativeness.
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In our final extension, we consider a model in which investors have general preferences and signals.3
We show that the condition for the irrelevance result to hold when investors are ex-ante identical in a
symmetric equilibrium is that the average ex-post demand sensitivities to information and noise (hedging
needs) react identically to a change in trading costs. This result shows that the forces behind our
irrelevance argument apply generally.
In addition to improving the understanding of whether the secular trend of reduction in trading
costs has affected the role played by financial markets in aggregating information, our results have
important practical implications for the broader discussion on the effect of transaction taxes as a policy
instrument. It is somewhat surprising that our irrelevance results and our directional result in the model
with endogenous information acquisition have been absent from policy discussions. Stiglitz (1989) and
Summers and Summers (1989) are good examples of policy-oriented articles which would have benefited
from using the results of this paper as a benchmark for policy analysis.
Like other irrelevance results in finance and economics, e.g., Modigliani and Miller (1958), Barro
(1974), Wallace (1981), Krueger and Lustig (2010), our irrelevance results are pedagogical in nature. We
do not argue that changes in trading costs do not affect price informativeness in practice.4 Our main
contribution is identifying the set of assumptions (investor homogeneity and exogenous information
precision) that must be violated for trading costs to affect price informativeness, as well as those that
are irrelevant (among others, the form of trading costs or the presence of market power). Our results
allow us to shed light on how different forms of investor heterogeneity affect the relation between trading
costs and price informativeness.
Related Literature
This paper lies at the intersection of two major strands of literature. On the one hand, we share the
emphasis of the work that studies the role played by financial markets in aggregating and originating
information, following Grossman (1976), Grossman and Stiglitz (1980), Hellwig (1980) and Diamond
and Verrecchia (1981). From a modeling perspective, our benchmark formulation with a continuum
of investors is closest to the large economy model in Admati (1985). Investors in our model have
private information about both the fundamental and the noise contained in the price. The existence
and multiplicity properties of the equilibria in related – but not identical – setups have been studied
by Ganguli and Yang (2009) and by Manzano and Vives (2011). In contrast to these papers, the noise
structure we assume in our model guarantees that an equilibrium always exists. In our model, aggregate
hedging needs are stochastic and not observable, similar to Manzano and Vives (2011) and Hatchondo,
Krusell and Schneider (2014). Goldstein, Li and Yang (2014) find that multiple equilibria may arise
when market segmentation leads to heterogeneous hedging needs. Our result in the case of general
3We consider a CARA-Gaussian setup for most of the paper. Therefore, our results should be interpreted as a first-order
approximation to more general environments (Ingersoll (1987), Huang and Litzenberger (1988)).
4For instance, our results associating a reduction in trading costs with an increase in information acquisition can be used
to rationalize the rise in the share of trading-type financial activities in aggregate GDP since the mid-1970’s, as documented
by Philippon (2015) and Greenwood and Scharfstein (2013).
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preferences and noise structure relates to the work of Barlevy and Veronesi (2000), Yuan (2005), Albagli,
Tsyvinski and Hellwig (2012), Breon-Drish (2015), and Chabakauri, Yuan and Zachariadis (2015), which
are relevant examples of the growing literature that explores information aggregation and acquisition in
alternative environments to the canonical CARA-Gaussian model.
Our results on endogenous information acquisition are related to the large literature that follows
Verrecchia (1982) and Kyle (1989). See Biais, Glosten and Spatt (2005), Vives (2008), Veldkamp (2009)
for recent thorough reviews of this line of work. We first allow investors to acquire information about
the fundamental as in Hellwig and Veldkamp (2009), Van Nieuwerburgh and Veldkamp (2010), and
Manzano and Vives (2011). Ganguli and Yang (2009) and Farboodi and Veldkamp (2016) study the
choice of whether to acquire information about fundamental or non-fundamental variables. These papers
abstract from modeling trading costs, which is the focus of our paper.
On the other hand, our results also relate to the body of literature that studies the effects of
transaction costs/taxes on financial markets, following Constantinides (1986) and Amihud and Mendelson
(1986). More recent contributions are Vayanos (1998), Vayanos and Vila (1999), Gârleanu and Pedersen
(2013), Abel, Eberly and Panageas (2013), and Gârleanu, Panageas and Yu (2014). These papers focus
on the implications of trading costs for volume or prices, while we focus on the effects on information
aggregation and information acquisition. We refer the reader to Vayanos and Wang (2012) for a recent
survey of this vast literature.
Only a handful of papers feature both technological trading costs and learning, as ours. Vives
(2016) shows in a linear-quadratic market game that introducing a quadratic trading cost can be welfare
improving by reducing the degree of private information acquisition. Subrahmanyam (1998) and Dow
and Rahi (2000) discuss the effect of quadratic trading costs in models of trading with strategic agents.
The inherent asymmetry among investors embedded in these papers explains their findings regarding
the effects of trading costs. Budish, Cramton and Shim (2015) show that a tax on trading is a coarse
instrument to reduce high frequency trading in a model with learning. In the context of a model of
bilateral trading with information acquisition but without information aggregation, Dang and Morath
(2015) compare profit and transaction taxes.
Finally, our paper is related to the body of work that studies whether structural changes in the
financial industry, as those motivated by the reduction in the cost of trading, have affected the role
played by financial markets in modern economies. Greenwood and Shleifer (2013), Philippon (2015),
Bai, Philippon and Savov (2015), and Turley (2012) document and interpret these trends, explaining
the forces behind them.
Outline Section 2 describes the benchmark model and Section 3 characterizes the equilibrium of the
model for the cases with ex-ante identical and ex-ante heterogeneous investors. Section 4 illustrates how
to break the main irrelevance result by varying the form of ex-ante heterogeneity. Section 5 allows for
endogenous information acquisition and Section 6 extends the irrelevance results to the cases with linear
and fixed trading costs, random heterogeneous priors, strategic investors, and general utility and signal
structure. Section 7 concludes. The Appendix contains derivations and proofs. The Online Appendix
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contains additional derivations and results.
2 Benchmark model: competitive investors with trading costs
As a benchmark, we initially study a competitive model of trading in financial markets with rational
investors who receive private signals about asset payoffs and have stochastic hedging needs. Within
this canonical framework, we characterize the conditions under which trading costs affect price
informativeness. In Section 6, we extend our model in multiple dimensions.
Preferences There are two dates t = 1, 2 and a unit measure of investors, indexed by i. Investors
choose their portfolio allocation at date 1 and consume at date 2. They maximize constant absolute risk
aversion (CARA) expected utility. Therefore, expected utility of investor i is given by
E [Ui (w2i)] with Ui (w2i) = −e−γiw2i , (1)
where Eq. (1) imposes that investors consume all their terminal wealth w2i. The parameter γi > 0
represents the coefficient of absolute risk aversion γi ≡ −U
′′
i
U ′i
.
Investment opportunities There are two assets in the economy, a riskless asset and a risky asset.
The riskless asset is in elastic supply and pays a gross interest rate R. Without loss of generality, we
normalize R to 1. The risky asset is in exogenously fixed supply Q ≥ 0. This asset is traded in a
competitive market at date 1 at price p. This price is quoted in terms of an underlying consumption
good (dollar), which acts as numeraire. Each investor i is endowed with q0i units of the risky asset at
date 1, where
´
q0idi = Q, since investors must hold as a whole the total supply of the asset Q. Similarly,
market clearing at date 1 implies that
´
q1idi = Q, where q1i denotes investor i’s final holdings of the
risky asset. Investors face no constraints when choosing portfolios: they can borrow and short sell freely.
The per unit asset payoff at date 2 is normally distributed and denoted by θ, where
θ ∼ N
(
θ, τ−1θ
)
. (2)
This formulation implies that there is aggregate uncertainty about the expected asset payoff. The
unconditional expected asset payoff is given by the constant θ ≥ 0, while its precision (the inverse of its
variance) corresponds to τθ.
Hedging needs Every investor i has a stochastic endowment of the consumption good at date 2,
denoted by n2i. This random endowment is normally distributed and potentially correlated with the
risky asset payoff θ.5 This endowment captures the fundamental risks associated with each individual
5Formally, each investor i draws a random pair (hi,Var [n2i]) that characterizes the joint normal distribution of his
endowment process n2i and the risky asset payoff θ, where Var [n2i] is such that the variance-covariance matrix of the
joint distribution is positive semi-definite. To be more specific, each investor i draws a random pair (hi,Var [n2i])
that characterizes the joint normal distribution of the endowment process n2i and the risky asset payoff θ, where(
n2i
θ
)
∼ N
((
E [n2i]
0
)
,Σi
)
with Σi=
[
Var [n2i] hi
hi τ
−1
hi + τ
−1
δ
]
and the restriction that, given hi, Var [n2i] is
such that Σi is positive semi-definite.
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investor’s normal economic activity. The covariance hi ≡ Cov [n2i, θ] determines whether the risky asset
is a good hedge for investor i (if hi < 0) or not (if hi > 0). More specifically, we assume that the
conditional covariance between the consumption good endowment and the asset payoff is constant and
equal to hi.6 At the beginning of date 1, before trading, every investor i learns the realization of his
individual hedging needs hi, given by
hi = δ + εhi, (3)
where
δ ∼ N
(
0, τ−1δ
)
and εhi ∼ N
(
0, τ−1hi
)
, (4)
and the realizations of εhi are independent across investors. This formulation implies that there is
uncertainty about the aggregate magnitude of hedging needs δ. The expected level of total hedging
needs is zero. Without loss of generality, we normalize the initial endowment n1i to zero for all investors
and assume that E [n2i]− γi2 Var [n2i] = 0.
Information structure Investors do not observe the actual realization of the risky asset payoff, θ.
However, every investor observes a private signal si about the asset payoff θ, with the following structure
si = θ + εsi,
where
εsi ∼ N
(
0, τ−1si
)
.
The realizations of εsi are independent across investors. In principle, we allow for the precision of the
private signal to be different for each investor. For now, we take the precisions of investors’ private
signals {τsi}i as a primitive of the economy.
Investors do not observe the aggregate hedging needs in the economy either. Investors only observe
their own realization of the hedging need, that is, hi is private information of investor i. Given the
formulation of hi in Eq. (3), hi contains information about the aggregate hedging need δ.
Trading costs Investors face quadratic trading costs. In particular, a change in the asset holdings
of the risky asset |q1i − q0i| incurs a trading cost, in terms of the numeraire, due at the same time the
transaction occurs, for both the buyer and the seller of
c
2 (∆q1i)
2 ,
where ∆q1i ≡ q1i − q0i. We model trading costs as quadratic in the size of the trade to preserve
tractability.7 Whether c corresponds to the use of economic resources (a trading cost) – our sustained
6This formulation is isomorphic to assuming that n2i covaries only with an unlearnable component of the asset payoff.
To avoid introducing additional notation, we relegate the specifics of this formulation to the Appendix. This assumption
is only important to guarantee existence of equilibrium but not to attain our main results. We thank our discussant Liyan
Yang for this suggestion.
7Our results easily extend to the case of trading costs that are proportional to the asset price level, as in c2p (∆q1i)
2.
We show in Section 6.1 that our irrelevance results also extend to the cases of linear and fixed costs.
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assumption – or whether it corresponds to a transfer (a transaction tax) is irrelevant for every positive
result in this paper.
The consumption/wealth of a given investor i at t = 2 is given by his stochastic endowment n2i, the
stochastic payoff of his asset holdings q1iθ, and the return on the investment in the riskless asset. This
includes the net purchase or sale of the risky asset (q0i − q1i) p and the total trading cost − c2 (∆q1i)2.
Formally, the final wealth of investor i is
w2i = n2i + q1iθ + q0ip− q1ip− c2 (∆q1i)
2 . (5)
Remark. There are four relevant dimensions of ex-ante heterogeneity among investors.
Ex-ante, investors can have different risk aversion γi, different initial asset holdings q0i, different
precision of their hedging needs τhi, and different precision of their private signals τsi. Ex-post, they also
differ in the realizations of their hedging needs hi and their signal si, which are stochastic.
Remark. Aggregate uncertainty on the level of stochastic hedging needs make the filtering problem non-
trivial, given that there are no exogenous noise traders in the model.
The presence of aggregate stochastic hedging needs make the filtering problem non-trivial: if τδ →∞,
the equilibrium of the economy becomes fully revealing. In order to have a meaningful filtering problem,
many papers studying learning introduce an unmodeled stochastic demand shock or, equivalently, a
shock to the number of shares available: this modeling approach is often referred to as having “noise
traders”. Allowing for noise traders in its standard form – as in Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) – is not
appropriate to study the effects of trading costs. In particular, in those models it is hard to understand
how the behavior of noise traders varies with the level of trading costs: this is a form of Lucas (1976)
Critique. Our theoretical results allow us to elaborate on this remark, which we do at the end of Section
3.
3 Equilibrium
We restrict our attention to rational expectations equilibria in which net demands are linear in the
investor’s private signal, his private hedging needs, and the price.
Definition. (Equilibrium) A rational expectations equilibrium in linear strategies consists of a linear
net portfolio demand ∆q1i for each every investor i and a price function p such that: a) each investor i
chooses ∆q1i to maximize his expected utility subject to his budget constraint and given his information
set and b) the price function p is such the market for the risky asset clears, that is
´
∆q1idi = 0.8
To characterize the equilibrium, we first study the portfolio problem of an individual investor i.
Subsequently, we study the equilibrium of the model with ex-ante identical investors, which allows us to
introduce our first irrelevance result. Finally, we characterize the equilibrium of the model in the general
8Because we adopt a formulation with a continuum of investors, as Admati (1985), our investors do not suffer from the
schizophrenia critique of Hellwig (1980).
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case with ex-ante heterogeneous investors and qualify the conditions under which trading costs affect
price informativeness and the direction of these effects.
Investors’ portfolio choice
Because of the CARA-Gaussian structure of preferences and returns, the demand for the risky asset of
every investor i is given by the solution to a mean-variance problem in q1i. Note that an investor i knows
the actual realization of his hedging needs when trading, although that realization is not known to other
investors. In particular, investor i chooses q1i to solve
max
q1i
(E [θ|si, hi, p]− γihi − p) q1i − γi2 Var [θ|si, hi, p] q
2
1i −
c
2 (∆q1i)
2 . (6)
The first term in the objective function of investor i represents the expected payoff of holding q1i units
of the risky asset. This expected payoff increases with the investor’s expected value of the fundamental,
E [θ|si, hi, p], decreases with the level of his realized hedging needs, hi, and decreases with the price he
has to pay for the risky asset, p. The second term captures the utility loss suffered by a risk-averse
investor who faces uncertainty about the asset payoff. The last term represents the trading cost the
investor must pay to adjust his asset holdings from q0i to q1i.
The first order condition of the problem stated in (6) yields the following demand for the risky asset
q1i =
E [θ|si, hi, p]− γihi − p+ cq0i
γiVar [θ|si, hi, p] + c . (7)
Intuitively, investor i demands more shares of the risky asset when the expected asset payoff E [θ|si, hi, p]
is high, when the risky asset is a good hedge (hi < 0), when the price of the risky asset is low, and when
the variance of risky asset Var [θ|si, hi, p] is low. More risk averse investors demand fewer shares of the
risky asset.
To interpret the effect of trading costs on the investors’ demands more easily, we rewrite the investors’
optimal portfolio decisions in the form of net demands
∆q1i = ωi (c) ∆qˆ1i, (8)
where
∆qˆ1i =
E [θ|si, hi, p]− γihi − p
γiVar [θ|si, hi, p] − q0i and ωi (c) =
γiVar [θ|si, hi, p]
γiVar [θ|si, hi, p] + c . (9)
Eq. (8) decomposes the investor’s net demand in two components: ∆qˆ1i and ωi (c). ∆qˆ1i represents the
net demand of investor i if he did not face trading costs. ωi (c) takes into account how trading costs
affect the net demand for the risky asset. ωi(c) ∈ [0, 1], it is a decreasing function of the trading cost c
and it satisfies limc→0 ωi (c) = 1 and limc→∞ ωi (c) = 0. This coefficient ωi (c) can be interpreted as an
attenuation weight that measures how the net demand of an investor changes relative to the case in which
the investor faces no trading costs. Alternatively, we can write Eq. (7) in the form of a weighted average
of investors’ initial asset holdings q0i and the hypothetical optimal portfolio demand in the absence of
trading costs, that is, q1i = ωi (c) qˆ1i + (1− ωi (c)) q0i.
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The equilibrium of the model is fully characterized by combining the portfolio decision of investors,
characterized in Eq. (7), with the market clearing condition for the risky asset, accounting for the filtering
problem solved by the investors. When forming their expectations about the fundamental, investors use
all the information available to them. Each investor i observes two signals about the fundamental θ: the
private signal si and the public signal revealed by the price p. Moreover, the realization of the individual
hedging hi need reveals information about the aggregate hedging need in the economy, δ, and, thus,
about the noise contained in the asset price.9
Equilibrium with ex-ante identical investors
As a benchmark, we consider the case in which all investors are ex-ante identical. That is, we assume
that all investors have identical risk aversion, initial asset holdings, variance of their hedging motives,
and precision of the private signal. Formally, γi = γ, q0i = q0, τhi = τh, and τsi = τs, ∀i.
In the class of symmetric equilibria in linear strategies that we study, we guess (and subsequently
verify) that investor i’s optimal net portfolio demand takes the form
∆q1i = αssi − αhhi − αpp+ ψ, (10)
where αs, αh, and αp are positive scalars, while ψ can take positive or negative values. αs, αh, and αp
respectively represent the demand sensitivities of investor i to his private signal, his realized hedging
needs and the price. All these sensitivities take into account the informational content of the relevant
variable. In particular, the price sensitivity αp accounts for the pecuniary cost of acquiring the asset and
for the informational content of prices, while the sensitivity to the hedging needs, αh, captures the level
of risk aversion as well as the informativeness of the individual hedging need about the aggregate level
of hedging needs in the economy, δ.
Market clearing implies that the equilibrium price takes the form
p = αs
αp
θ − αh
αp
δ + ψ
αp
. (11)
A higher fundamental value of the asset θ and higher aggregate hedging needs, low δ, increase the asset
price. The last term in Eq. (11) embeds both the unconditional expected payoff of the risky asset and
a risk premium.
The price p contains information about the fundamental value of the asset and about the aggregate
hedging needs in the economy, as can be seen from Eq. (11). While investors intrinsically care about the
value of θ, they care about the aggregate hedging need δ only insofar it allows them to predict θ more
accurately from prices. Therefore, an investor i uses his information about the aggregate hedging need
when extracting information from prices. Let pˆ = αpαs p−
ψ
αs
be the unbiased signal of θ contained in the
price p for an external observer. Then, the (augmented) unbiased signal of the fundamental contained
9For reference, we characterize the equilibrium of our model when investors do not learn from prices in the Online
Appendix.
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in the price for an investor with hedging needs hi is
pˆ+ αh
αs
E [δ|hi]
∣∣∣∣ θ ∼ N (θ, τ−1pˆ ) ,
where
E [δ|hi] = τh
τδ + τh
hi and τpˆ =
(
αs
αh
)2
(τδ + τh) . (12)
This signal corresponds to the unbiased signal in prices pˆ, augmented by the information contained in
the private hedging needs. When the realization of hi is high, investor i assigns a high probability to
the aggregate level of hedging needs δ also being high, which, for a given price p, increases the perceived
expected payoff θ.
After solving the filtering problem, investor i’s conditional expectation of the fundamental value of
the asset E [θ|si, hi, p] takes the form
E [θ| si, hi, p] =
τθθ + τssi + τpˆ
(
pˆ+ αhαsE [δ|hi]
)
τθ + τs + τpˆ
. (13)
The expectation in Eq. (13) is a weighted average of the prior on the fundamental θ, the private signal
si, and the augmented signal contained in prices, pˆ+ αhαsE [δ|hi].
An external observer only gathers information from the asset price. Therefore, from an external
observer’s perspective, the unbiased signal contained in the price is distributed as follows
pˆ| θ ∼ N
(
θ,
(
τ epˆ
)−1)
, where τ epˆ =
(
αs
αh
)2
τδ. (14)
Not surprisingly, an investor i extracts more precise information from the price than an external
observer, i.e., τpˆ ≥ τ epˆ , because the investor can filter out part of the aggregate noise. When τ epˆ → 0,
observing the asset price does not reveal any information about the asset payoff θ. Alternatively, when
τ epˆ →∞, asset prices are arbitrarily precise and observing the asset price perfectly reveals the realization
of θ. Without aggregate risk on hedging needs, that is, τδ → ∞, it is evident from Eq. (12) that the
equilibrium price is fully revealing and that Grossman (1976) paradox applies.
Definition. (Price Informativeness) We define price informativeness as the precision of the unbiased
signal of the payoff θ contained in the asset price, from the perspective of an external observer. Formally,
we use τ epˆ , as defined in Eq. (14), as the relevant measure of price informativeness.
This measure of price informativeness, which captures the precision of the information about
fundamentals contained in the price, is the relevant welfare measure for an outside observer whose utility
depends on knowing the value of θ.10 See the Online Appendix for a derivation. This result justifies
why we use price informativeness as our variable of interest, as opposed to focusing on the welfare of
the investors within the model, which is only driven by risk-sharing considerations. In our model, it’s
10For clarity, we abstract from production in our model. It is easy to append a production side to this model which
exclusively uses asset prices as a source of information to guide production decisions, as we show in the Online Appendix. It
is somewhat more involved to introduce feedback effects between real and financial markets, as discussed in Bond, Edmans
and Goldstein (2012). There is no a priori reason for why that would affect our results.
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straightforward to show that whenever the irrelevance results apply, investors are worse (better) off when
trading costs are higher (lower), regardless of whether trading costs are rebated or not.
Lemma 1. (Existence and multiplicity) An equilibrium always exists. There are at most three
equilibria.
The existence and uniqueness properties of the equilibrium are determined by studying the solutions
of the following cubic equation in αsαh
γ (τδ + τh)
(
αs
αh
)3
− τh
(
αs
αh
)2
+ γ (τs + τθ)
(
αs
αh
)
− τs = 0. (15)
In the Appendix, we show that Eq. (15) has at least one positive real solution, establishing equilibrium
existence. We also show that Eq. (15) generically has one or three positive real solutions, depending
on primitives. Moreover, we also show in the Appendix that, if there are multiple equilibria, the middle
equilibrium is not stable. This allows us to direct our analysis to the higher and lower equilibria, which
can be made stable under plausible assumptions on equilibrium convergence.
Multiple equilibria in this environment arise when strategic complementarities in learning are
sufficiently strong. The equilibrium price contains information about the fundamental asset payoff θ
and about the aggregate hedging need in the economy δ, which acts as noise and makes the price only
partially revealing. Therefore, the price is a public signal of the fundamental and the noise. When
price informativeness increases, the precision of the price as a signal of the fundamental increases while
its precision as a signal of the noise decreases. Intuitively, an increase in price informativeness αsαh has
two effects on an individual investor’s behavior. First, given that the price becomes a better public
signal about θ, the investor optimally assigns less weight to his private signal, which reduces αs and the
informativeness of the individual investor’s demand, αsαh . This channel makes investors’ decisions strategic
substitutes and pushes towards a unique equilibrium. Second, since an increase in price informativeness
also makes the price a worse public signal about δ, the investor optimally assigns more weight to his
hedging need hi as a private signal about the aggregate noise and reduces his αh, which increases the
price informativeness of the investor’s demand αsαh .
11 This channel makes investors’ decisions strategic
complements and, when strong enough, can generate multiple equilibria.
The two stable equilibria share the following properties:
a)
∂
(
αs
αh
)
∂τh
> 0, b)
∂
(
αs
αh
)
∂τs
> 0, c)
∂
(
αs
αh
)
∂γ
< 0, d)
∂
(
αs
αh
)
∂τθ
< 0, and e)
∂
(
αs
αh
)
∂τδ
< 0. (16)
Figure 1 illustrates how the equilibrium values of αsαh vary with γ, τs, and τh, for the reference
parameters in Table 1. As described above, the ratio αsαh measures the demand’s relative sensitivity
to information versus hedging needs. On the one hand, as shown by a) and b) above, very precise
private signals and very small dispersion of hedging needs make investors relatively more willing to trade
11The more an investor relies on hi as a signal about δ, the lower αh. Intuitively, a high hi for an investor that learns
about δ from the equilibrium price suggests that other investors are selling the risky asset for reasons not related to its
payoffs, which dampens the desire to sell purely for hedging reasons, reducing the sensitivity of investors’ demand to hi.
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on information, as opposed to trading based on their hedging needs. On the other hand, high levels
of risk aversion and low degrees of prior uncertainty (high precision) either about the fundamental or
aggregate hedging needs make investors relatively more willing to trade on hedging needs as opposed to
information, as can be seen in c), d), and e) above.
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Figure 1: Equilibrium values of αsαh for different γ, τs, and τh
Table 1: Reference parameters for Figure 1
γ = 0.5 τs = 0.4 τh = 10 τθ = 10 τδ = 0.1
Figure 2 provides heat maps of the multiplicity regions for different combinations of γ, τs, and τh.
When γ is sufficiently high, only the unique equilibrium with low price informativeness survives. On the
contrary, when γ is sufficiently low, only the unique equilibrium with high price informativeness survives.
For intermediate values of risk aversion, increased precision of private information and hedging needs
make more likely the unique equilibrium with high price informativeness and vice versa.
All other equilibrium objects are uniquely pinned down given an equilibrium value of αsαh . The
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Figure 2: Uniqueness/multiplicity regions for different combinations of γ, τs, and τh
conjectured coefficients of investors’ net demands are given in equilibrium by
αs =
1
κ
τs
τθ + τs + τpˆ
, αp =
1
κ
τs
τs + τpˆ
,
αh =
1
κ
(
γ − αs
αh
τh
τθ + τs + τpˆ
)
, and ψ = αp
(
τθ
τθ + τs + τpˆ
θ − γVar [θ|si, p] q0
)
,
where we define κ ≡ γVar [θ|si, p] + c.
The coefficient αs, which determines the sensitivity of the demand for the risky asset with respect to
investors’ private signals, is increasing in the precision of investors private signals τs. When the signal
is more informative, investors put more weight on their signals since a higher realization of the signal
increases the expected payoff of the asset.
The coefficient αh determines the sensitivity of the demand for the risky asset with respect to hedging
needs. Naturally, more risk averse investors react more to their hedging needs, as captured by γ. Because
investors’ partially infer the aggregate component of hedging from their individual realization, they
dampen their demand response to hi. Intuitively, a high realization of hi, which induces investors to
sell for hedging reasons, implies that other investors also desire to sell for hedging reasons, which, for a
given price, makes investing in the risky asset more desirable.
The coefficient αp, which determines the sensitivity of the demand for the risky asset with respect
to the asset price, features a substitution effect and an information effect. When τpˆ → 0, there is no
information effect and αp → 1κ . In this case, the elasticity of investor i portfolio demand the prices is
given by 1κ , as in the model without learning: this is the standard substitution effect caused by price
changes. When prices are somewhat informative, i.e., when τpˆ > 0, an information effect arises. Investors
are less sensitive to price changes since high prices induce investors to infer that the expected asset payoff
is high and vice versa. The value of information contained in asset prices τpˆ relative to the information
in private signals τs determines the relative sensitivity of the investor’s demand to the asset price αp.
The coefficient ψ determines the autonomous demand for the risky asset, which does not depend on
private signals, prices or hedging needs. This autonomous demand is proportional to the price coefficient
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αp and it has two components. Its first component captures the (weighted) unconditional expected value
of the asset. Its second component captures the risk premium associated with holding the risky asset.
Importantly, the equilibrium values of αs, αh, and αp are directly modulated by κ, which is a measure
of investors risk tolerance and trading costs. The fact that κ enters multiplicatively in all three variables
makes the ratios αsαh ,
αs
αp
, and αhαp independent of the level of trading costs, which is crucial to establish
our main result.
Theorem 1. (Irrelevance theorem with ex-ante identical investors) When investors are ex-ante
identical, price informativeness in any equilibrium is independent of the level of trading costs. Formally,
the precision of the unbiased signal about the fundamental revealed by the asset price τ epˆ does not depend
on c.
Theorem 1 establishes the first main irrelevance result of the paper. Theorem 1 shows that price
informativeness is independent of the level of trading costs. Two identical economies with different levels
of trading costs c have equally informative prices. Intuitively, high trading costs make investors less
willing to trade on both their private information and their hedging needs, leaving unchanged the total
relative demand sensitivities to hedging and information and, consequently, the signal-to-noise ratio in
asset prices. Therefore, price informativeness is not affected by changes in the level of trading costs.
Moreover, changes in the level of trading costs do not affect the structure of the set of equilibria. That is,
in the context of Theorem 1, the set of equilibrium levels of price informativeness is invariant to the level
of trading costs. Theorem 1 provides a natural benchmark to understand the role of trading costs on
the informational efficiency of the economy: only departures from ex-ante homogeneity across investors
can generate an effect of trading costs on information aggregation.
Although this paper focuses on the effects of trading costs on learning and price informativeness,
Theorem 1 (and all other irrelevance results in this paper) apply to the unconditional volatility of asset
prices, as we show in the Appendix. Intuitively, given that the reduction on buying and selling pressures
is symmetric across all investors, asset prices remain unaffected by variations in the level of trading
costs.12
Even though price informativeness and volatility are independent of c, other equilibrium outcomes,
like portfolio holdings and trading volume do depend on the level of trading costs. The net trading in
equilibrium by investor i can be written as a function of the realizations of εsi and εhi as follows
∆q1i = αsεsi − αhεhi.
Because αs and αh are decreasing in the level of trading costs c, the level of net trading by an individual
investor is decreasing in c.
The effects on aggregate trading volume are similar. Using a Law of Large Numbers, we can exactly
12In Davila and Parlatore (2017), we systematically study the relation between price informativeness and price volatility
in a general class of models of financial market trading.
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express trading volume in this economy, defined as the number of shares traded and denoted by V, as
V = 12
ˆ
|∆q1i| di = 1√2pi
(
α2s
τs
+ α
2
h
τh
) 1
2
.
Because αs and αh are decreasing in the level of trading costs c, the level of aggregate trading volume is
decreasing in c. Formally, we show that
dV
dc
< 0.
Therefore, even when price informativeness remains unchanged, trading volume will decrease when
trading costs are higher.
Equilibrium with ex-ante heterogeneous investors
Theorem 1 is an important benchmark to understand how trading costs affect informational efficiency.
However, investors may be ex-ante heterogeneous along different dimensions. In this section, we study
how ex-ante asymmetries among investors break our irrelevance result. Formally, we let γi, τsi, τhi, and
q0i take arbitrary values across the distribution of investors.
Given a price p, Eq. (7) continues to determine investor i’s demand for the risky asset. In the
equilibrium in linear strategies that we study, we guess and subsequently verify that the optimal portfolio
of investor i takes the form
∆q1i = αsisi − αhihi − αpip+ ψi, (17)
where αsi, αhi, and αpi are positive scalars for every investor i and ψi can be positive or negative.
Market clearing implies that the equilibrium price takes the form
p = αs
αp
θ − αh
αp
δ + ψ
αp
, (18)
where we denote the cross sectional averages of the individual coefficients by αs =
´
αsidi, αh =
´
αhidi,
αp =
´
αpidi, and ψ =
´
ψidi. The interpretation of Eq. (17) and Eq. (18) is the analogous to the
interpretation of Eq. (10) and Eq. (11) in the model with ex-ante identical investors. We denote by
pˆe = αpαs p−
ψ
αs
the unbiased signal of θ from the perspective of an external observer, which is distributed
as follows
pˆe|θ ∼ N
(
θ,
(
τ epˆ
)−1)
, where τ epˆ =
(
αs
αh
)2
τδ.
As before, we adopt τ epˆ as the relevant measure of price informativeness. We relegate the exact
characterization of the equilibrium to the Appendix, and exclusively focus on the implications of trading
costs for price informativeness.
Theorem 2 focuses on the case in which two groups of investors are heterogeneous across a single
dimension. In that case, we show that an increase in trading costs is associated with a reduction in price
informativeness for any set of primitives.
Theorem 2. (One-dimensional heterogeneity) When two groups of investors differ along one
dimension of heterogeneity in i) risk aversion, ii) precision of private information, or iii) precision
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of hedging needs across, an increase in trading costs is always associated with a decrease in price
informativeness.
We show that one dimensional heterogeneity in primitives across two groups of investors in risk
aversion, the precision of private information, or hedging needs implies that trading costs reduce price
informativeness. This result arises because investors with more precise information, either about the
fundamental or the aggregate hedging, or with relatively high risk tolerance, trade more aggressively
in general and react more to trading costs, while putting more weight on their private signal about
the fundamental and contributing relatively more information to the price. Intuitively, all three forms
of heterogeneity endogenously generate a positive cross-sectional correlation between aggressive trading
behavior and relative sensitivities to information versus hedging. We describe in detail how this pattern
emerges endogenously in our numerical illustration in Section 4.
Theorem 3 extends the result in Theorem 2 to multi-dimensional heterogeneity. When investors
differ in two dimensions, we show that an increase in trading costs is associated with a reduction in
price informativeness for most combinations of primitives.13 We also provide a general characterization
of the directional change in price informativeness that accommodates multi-dimensional heterogeneity.
This directional change is expressed as a function of asset demand sensitivities, which in our model are
equilibrium objects, and clearly illustrates the intuition behind the economic mechanisms that drive the
results.
Theorem 3. (Two-dimensional heterogeneity and general directional effects of trading costs
with ex-ante heterogeneous investors) a) When two groups of investors differ along two out of the
three following dimensions: i) risk aversion, ii) precision of private information, or iii) precision of
hedging needs across, an increase in trading costs is associated with a decrease in price informativeness
for most parameter combinations.
b) When the difference in relative-to-the-average sensitivities between information and hedging
motives for trading, αsiαs −
αhi
αh
, is positively (negatively) correlated in the cross-section of investors with
the demand sensitivity 1κi , an increase in trading costs c decreases (increases) price informativeness in
a given equilibrium. Formally, the sign of dτ
e
pˆ
dc is determined by
sgn
(
dτ epˆ
dc
)
= − sgn
(
Covi
[
αsi
αs
− αhi
αh
,
1
κi
])
. (19)
When investors are heterogeneous along multiple dimensions of heterogeneity, price informativeness
can either increase or decrease with trading costs. For example, when a group of investors with high risk
aversion also have a high precision of private information, an increase in trading costs disproportionally
reduces the amount of information incorporated into the price and price informativeness increases when
trading costs increase. In Section 4, we provide specific examples of this phenomenon and illustrate the
specific combinations that are associated with a positive value for dτ
e
pˆ
dc .
13By most combinations, we formally mean over 50% of the parameter space.
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In Theorem 3b, independently of the primitives of the economy, the equilibrium objects αsi, αhi,
and κi are sufficient statistics to determine how changes in the level of trading costs affect price
informativeness. This characterization illustrates the economic mechanisms at play. In general, when
investors are heterogeneous, an increase in trading costs can increase or decrease price informativeness,
depending on the sign of −Covi
[
αsi
αs
− αhiαh , 1κi
]
. This is the negative of the cross-sectional covariance of
two terms. The first term corresponds to the difference between relative sensitivities to private signals
on the fundamental and relative sensitivities to hedging. The second term corresponds to the demand
sensitivity of investors to trading costs: when 1κi is high, investors trade aggressively and their overall
demand is highly sensitive to price changes and trading costs. Intuitively, when the investors who are
relatively more sensitive to information than to hedging needs, that is, those with a high αsiαs −
αhi
αh
, are
also the more responsive to changes in trading costs, that is, those for which 1κi is high, we show that
high trading costs reduce price informativeness and vice versa.
Not every form of heterogeneity breaks down the irrelevance result. In particular, heterogeneity
about initial positions leaves price informativeness unaffected by changes in the level of trading costs,
since αsi, αhi, and κi remain unaffected. Trading costs affect price informativeness as long as investors
differentially trade on information and hedging needs. Therefore, whenever γi, τsi, and τhi are constant,
demand sensitivities are identical across all investors, which leaves the signal-to-noise raise unchanged.
Remark. (Comparison with standard noise trading formulations) Our irrelevance results crucially depend
on the fact that all investors are symmetrically affected by the change in trading costs. At times, for
tractability, models of learning in financial markets assume an ad-hoc supply/demand shock, often
referred to as “noise trading”. Taken at face value, this assumption leads us to believe that high trading
costs are associated with low price informativeness. In these models, an increase in trading costs reduces
the amount of information in asset prices because only informed investors react to this change, while
noise traders’ demand is fully inelastic. The classic noise trading formulation can be viewed as a special
case of our model in which a group of investors inelastically trades on hedging motives. Theorem 2 shows
that increasing trading costs in an economy with a set of perfectly inelastic investors who do not trade
on information makes prices less informative.
4 Numerical illustration
To provide a deeper understanding of Theorems 1 through 3, we conduct three different numerical
exercises. First, we illustrate how price informativeness and trading volume vary with the level of
trading costs for different combinations of risk aversion and precision about the fundamental for a
subset of investors. Second, we illustrate how most combinations of heterogeneity in risk aversion
and the precision of the private signal about the fundamental are associated with a decrease in price
informativeness when trading costs increase. Third, we show that most combinations of risk aversion
and the precision of hedging needs are also associated with a decrease in price informativeness when
trading costs increase.
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4.1 Effects of trading costs on price informativeness and volume
Figure 3 illustrates the effect of trading costs in the equilibrium price informativeness and trading
volume. To build on the insights from Theorems 2 and 3, we assume that there are two groups of
investors, denoted by i = A,B, each of them accounting for one half of the total population. Investors’
initially own a single share of the risky asset, so q0i = Q = 1, ∀i. We assume that all investors have
identically distributed hedging needs, i.e., τhi = 1, ∀i. We also assume that τδ = τθ = 1. This choice of
parameters guarantees that we are in a region with a unique equilibrium.
We compare five different parameter configurations. First, we consider the benchmark with ex-ante
identical investors assume that τsA = τsB = 1 and γA = γB = 1. In that case, the irrelevance result
of Theorem 1 applies and τpˆ is independent of the level of trading costs. Trading volume, as expected,
decreases with the level of trading costs.
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Figure 3: Comparative statics on trading costs c (values are relative to c = 0)
Second, we assume that A-investors are better informed than B-investors by increasing the precision
of their private signal about the fundamental. Specifically, we set τsA = 10 and γA = 1. In this case, τpˆ
decreases with the level of trading costs. With this parametrization, A-investors are more informed and
more price sensitive than B-investors. Therefore, as shown in Theorem 2, price informativeness must
decrease when trading costs increase: the reduction in trading by the more informed and more sensitive
A-investors makes prices less informative.
Third, we preserve the asymmetry on information precision while also making A-investors more risk
averse. In particular, we set τsA = 10 and γA = 3. In this case, A-investors are more informed and less
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price sensitive than B-investors at the margin. Exploiting Theorem 3b), we expect an increase in trading
costs to increase price informativeness. Less informed but more sensitive B-investors disproportionally
trade less, while the smaller reduction in trading by the less sensitive and better informed A-investors
makes prices more informative.
Fourth, we assume that A-investors are more risk averse than B-investors, although both groups are
equally informed. In this case, A-investors give a higher weight to trading due to hedging needs at the
same time that they have a less sensitive demand. An increase in trading costs has a bigger impact
on the trades of B-investors, who are relatively more demand sensitive, reducing price informativeness.
This is again consistent with Theorem 2.
Finally, we assume that B-investors are more risk averse than A-investors, who are better informed.
This configuration is similar to the second one. An increase in trading costs in that case disproportionally
reduces the demand by the relatively better informed A-investors, reducing price informativeness.
Figure 3 illustrates how price informativeness and trading volume vary with the level of trading costs
c for the different parameter combinations. We express all variables as a ratio relative to the c = 0
reference point. For all parameter configurations, trading volume goes down, as expected.
4.2 Heterogeneity on the precision of signals on fundamental and risk aversion
We systematically study how two-dimensional heterogeneity in risk aversion and in the precision of
private information about the fundamental determines the effect of trading costs on price informativeness.
We adopt as reference the case in which γB = 1 and τsB = 1. In Figure 4, we plot equilibrium price
informativeness relative to the case when c = 0 for different combinations of γA, in the horizontal axis,
and τsA, in the vertical axis. This analysis generalizes Figure 3. By design, when γA = 1 and τsA = 1,
the heat map takes a unit value, because price informativeness is invariant to the level of trading costs.
Figure 4 shows that most combinations of risk aversion and precision of the signal on the fundamental
heat map values are less than unity.14 Intuitively, investors with relatively high risk aversion become
less aggressive traders and, at the same time, more prone to trade on their hedging. This implies that
an increase in trading costs disproportionally reduces the trading of the less risk averse investors, who
are those adding more information to the price. Similarly, investors with precise information on the
fundamental are, in general, more aggressive and at the same time more willing to trade on their private
information. This implies that an increase in trading costs disproportionally reduces the trades of the
investors with more precise signals, who are those adding more information to the price.
Only parameter combinations in which a group of investors has high risk aversion, making them less
aggressive traders, and high precision of their signal on the fundamental, implying that they react strongly
to their private information on the fundamental, are associated with increases in price informativeness
when trading costs increase. As expected, the higher the level of trading costs, the stronger the effects
on equilibrium price informativeness.
14Theorem 1 implies that the point (γA, τsA) = (1, 1) takes a unit value. Theorem 2 implies that points of the form (x, 1)
or (1, y), for any x 6= 1 or y 6= 1, take values strictly less than unity.
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Figure 4: Heat map of price informativeness (values are relative to c = 0)
4.3 Heterogeneity on the precision of signals on hedging needs and risk aversion
Finally, we study how two-dimensional heterogeneity in the precision (volatility) of investors’ hedging
needs determines the effect of trading costs on price informativeness. In this case, we assume that
τsA = τsB = 1, and take as reference the case in which γB = 1 and τhB = 1. In Figure 4, we plot
equilibrium price informativeness relative to the case when c = 0 for different combinations of γA, in the
horizontal axis, and τhA, in the vertical axis. Again, by design, when γA = 1 and τhA = 1, the heat map
takes a unit value, because price informativeness is invariant to the level of trading costs.
Figure 5 also shows that most combinations of risk aversion and precision of hedging needs for A-
investors are associated with reductions in price informativeness. Intuitively, investors with very volatile
hedging needs (low precision τh) in general trade less aggressively, because their perceived variance of
the fundamental Var [θ| si, hi, p] is higher. At the same time, because they are relatively less informed
about the noise in asset prices, they react more strongly to the realization of hi. This implies that an
increase in trading costs disproportionally reduces trading by investors with less volatile hedging needs,
which are those who react more strongly in relative terms to their private signals about the fundamental,
reducing price informativeness. As before, the higher the level of trading costs, the stronger the effects
on equilibrium price informativeness.
We summarize the new insights that emerge from Figures 4 and 5 in the following remark.
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Figure 5: Heat map of price informativeness (values are relative to c = 0)
Remark. (Heterogeneity and price informativeness) Consistent with Theorem 3, Figures 4 and 5, show
that most combinations of parameters involving risk aversion, the precision of the private signal about
the fundamental, or the precision of hedging needs, that generate heterogeneity across investors are
associated with a negative response of price informativeness to trading costs. Consistent with Theorem
2, one-dimensional heterogeneity is also associated with negative responses of price informativeness to
trading costs.
5 Endogenous information acquisition
So far, our analysis has treated the precision of investors’ private information as a primitive of the model.
In this section, we allow investors to optimally choose the precision of their private signals.15 In the
paper, we consider the case in which investors choose the precision of their private signals about the
fundamental θ. In the Online Appendix, we extend the benchmark model by allowing investors to receive
a private signal about the aggregate hedging need δ and allow them to choose the precision of that signal.
Both scenarios yield identical insights. To isolate the effects coming from information acquisition, we
15The model with exogenous precision can be interpreted as modeling the short-run response to trading costs changes,
when investors have not adjusted their information gathering technology. The model with endogenous information
acquisition can be interpreted as modeling long-run responses, after investors adjust how they gather information.
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focus our attention on the case with ex-ante identical investors. To simplify our calculations, we assume
that the risky asset is in zero net supply throughout this section.
5.1 Endogenous precision of the signal about the fundamental
The exact timing of the investors’ choices is represented in Figure 6. As in the benchmark model,
investors choose their portfolio allocation q1i at date 1, after observing the realizations of si and hi,
while filtering the information contained in the asset price. Now, at date 0, every investor chooses the
precision of his private signal τsi at a cost λ (τsi), where λ (·) is continuous and twice differentiable and
it satisfies, λ′ (·) > 0, λ′′ (·) ≥ 0 and the Inada condition limτsi→∞ λ′ (τsi) = ∞. In the simulations, we
assume that λ (·) is quadratic.
Precision choice
τsi (or τηi)
Portfolio choice
q1i
Payoffs realized
θ
t = 0 t = 1 t = 2
Figure 6: Timeline endogenous information acquisition
The equilibrium of this augmented game is subgame perfect, i.e., it takes into account the equilibrium
played in the trading stage. However, since there may be multiple equilibria in the trading stage of the
game, the probability with which each equilibrium is played at date 1 is also an equilibrium outcome.
We continue to restrict our attention to equilibria in linear strategies in the trading stage.
Definition. (Equilibrium) An equilibrium in the information acquisition game is a set of precision
choices for each investor i, {τsi}i, and a probability pi with which the high equilibrium is played if there
are multiple equilibria in the trading game such that a) each investor chooses the precision of his private
signal τsi to maximize his expected utility V
(
τsi; {τsj}j 6=i
)
, as defined in Eq. (20), given pi and the other
investors’ precision choices {τsj}j 6=i, and b) the probability pi is a sunspot equilibrium of the trading
game at date 1 given the precision choices {τsj}i.
We prove Theorem 4 allowing for pi ∈ [0, 1]. To simplify the analysis and highlight the economic
mechanisms, we focus on equilibria with a degenerate distribution pi ∈ {0, 1} in what follows.
Investors’ information choice Each investor i takes the equilibrium of the model starting at date
1 and the other investors’ precision choices as given when he chooses his own precision. Specifically, an
investor i optimally chooses τsi by solving
max
τsi
V
(
τsi; {τsj}j 6=i
)
, where V
(
τsi; {τsj}j 6=i
)
= E [vi]− λ (τsi) , (20)
and E [vi] is given by16
E [vi] = Cov [(E [θ|si, hi, p]− γhi − p) , q∗1i]−
1
2 (γVar [θ|si, hi, p] + c)E
[
(q∗1i)
2
]
,
16Our choice of objective function is standard in these environments. It is studied and justified in Veldkamp (2009) and
Van Nieuwerburgh and Veldkamp (2010). They show that the expected utility case delivers analogous qualitative insights.
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where q∗1i and p correspond to the date 1 equilibrium outcomes, which are a function of the precision
choices of all investors.
Best responses and equilibrium determination The first order condition of the investor’s problem
in Eq. (20) fully characterizes the best response of investor i – we show in the Appendix that the second
order condition for the investors’ problem always holds. Formally, the best response τsi
(
{τsj}j 6=i
)
is
given by the solution to
∂Cov [(E [θ|si, hi, p]− γhi − p) , q∗1i]
∂τsi︸ ︷︷ ︸
∆ in accuracy
− γ2
∂Var [θ|si, hi, p]
∂τsi
E
[
(q∗1i)
2
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
∆ in perceived risk
(21)
= γ2Var [θ|si, hi, p]
∂Var [q∗1i]
∂τsi︸ ︷︷ ︸
∆ in risk taking
+ c2
∂Var [q∗1i]
∂τsi︸ ︷︷ ︸
∆ in trading costs
+ λ′ (τsi)︸ ︷︷ ︸
∆ in information cost
.
The left hand side of Eq. (21) represents the marginal benefit of increasing the precision of the
private signal. It has two terms. First, increasing the precision of the signal about the fundamental
changes the accuracy of the demand function submitted by an investor. An investor wants to have a
high demand for the risky asset when it offers a good return, and vice versa. Second, increasing the
precision of the signal about the fundamental reduces the level of risk perceived by the investor. The
right hand side of Eq. (21) represents the marginal cost of increasing the precision of the private signal.
It has three terms. The first term captures the change in risk born by the investor when the expected
final asset holdings change. The second term corresponds to the marginal change in trading costs. The
last term is the marginal cost of increasing the precision of the signal.
In the following lemma, we establish that there is an equilibrium in the information acquisition stage
and that all equilibria are symmetric.
Lemma 2. (Existence and symmetry of equilibrium) There always exists an equilibrium in the
information acquisition stage. Any equilibrium is symmetric.
A higher precision of the private signal received by investors, increases the accuracy of their demand
and reduces their perceived variance of the fundamental. Then, by inspecting Eq. (21), we can see that,
since investors can benefit less from acquiring information when trading costs are higher, information
acquisition decreases with trading costs. This is the main result of this section, formally stated in
Theorem 4.
Theorem 4. (Effect of trading costs with endogenous precision of the fundamental signal)
When investors are ex-ante identical, an increase in trading costs decreases the information acquired
about the fundamental in equilibrium, i.e.,
dτ∗si
dc
< 0.
In the two well-behaved equilibria, this reduction in information acquisition also generates a reduction in
price informativeness, hence dτ
e
pˆ
dc < 0.
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As Theorem 4 shows, higher trading costs induce investors to choose less precise signals in equilibrium,
which makes prices less informative whenever investors coordinate on the stable equilibria of the trading
stage, as described in Eq. (16). Figure 7 further illustrates the effect of trading costs on the equilibrium
on information acquisition choices and price informativeness.
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
3
3.5
4
4.5
5
c
τ
∗ s
Precision Choice τ
∗
s
 
 
τ
∗
s
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.25
0.3
0.35
c
τ
e pˆ
Price Informativeness τ
e
pˆ
 
 
τ
e
pˆ
Figure 7: Equilibrium comparative statics
Our irrelevance result derived in the case of exogenously given information precisions does not extend
to situations in which investors acquire information. Intuitively, the presence of trading costs makes
acquiring information less profitable for every individual investor. In equilibrium, even though the
reduction on the precision of information acquired by every other investor in the economy due to the
trading costs increases the incentives for an individual investor to acquire information, this effect is not
large enough to overcome the original reduction of information precision choice caused by the higher
trading cost.
6 Extensions: generalizing the irrelevance result
Finally, we show that our irrelevance argument is valid in more general economies. In particular, we
extend our benchmark model with ex-ante identical investor to show that it remains valid in environments
with linear trading costs, fixed trading costs, random heterogeneous priors, strategic investors, and
general utility and signal structure.
When trading costs are linear on the number of shares traded or fixed, as opposed to quadratic, some
investors decide not to trade all, changing the nature of the equilibrium. However, price informativeness
remains unaffected. Allowing for random heterogeneous priors shows that the irrelevance argument does
not rely on aggregate hedging noise, but that aggregate uncertainty regarding the level of other trading
motives preserves the irrelevance. We also show that strategic behavior considerations do not affect our
irrelevance result when investors are ex-ante identical.17 Departures from homogeneity would break our
irrelevance results in a similar way to Theorem 3 and Section 4.
17In the Online Appendix, we extend our irrelevance result to the case of multiple rounds of trading. Although investors’
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6.1 Linear trading costs
In this extension, we modify the form of the trading costs faced by investors.18 We now assume that
investors face a linear trading cost φ ≥ 0 per share traded of the risky asset. In particular, a change in
the asset holdings of the risky asset |∆q1i| incurs a trading cost of
φ |∆q1i|
There are two benefits modeling trading costs as linear. First, they overcome the problem of order slicing
associated with any nonlinear trading cost. Second, they can be derived as the compensation to a group
of outside agents that operate a constant returns to scale trading technology that facilitates trading.
The demand for the risky asset of every investor i is given by the solution to
max
q1i
(E [θ|si, hi, p]− γhi − p) q1i − γ2Var [θ|si, hi, p] q
2
1i − φ |∆q1i| , (22)
where their optimal portfolio choice, which features an inaction region, is given by
∆q1i =

∆q+1i =
E[θ|si,hi,p]−γhi−p−φ
γVar[θ|si,hi,p] − q0, if ∆q
+
1i > 0
0, if ∆q+1i ≤ 0, ∆q−1i ≥ 0
∆q−1i =
E[θ|si,hi,p]−γhi−p+φ
γVar[θ|si,hi,p] − q0, if ∆q
−
1i < 0.
(23)
In a symmetric equilibrium in linear strategies, we postulate net demand functions for buyers (∆q+1i)
and sellers (∆q−1i) respectively given by
∆q+1i = αssi − αhhi − αpp+ ψ+ (24)
∆q−1i = αssi − αhhi − αpp+ ψ−,
where αs, αh, and αp are positive scalars, while ψ+ and ψ− can take positive or negative values.
Market clearing in the asset market implies that the equilibrium price takes the form
p = αs
αp
θ − αh
αp
δ + ψ
αp
, (25)
where we define ψ = ψ++ψ−2 . The derivation of Eq. (25) exploits equilibrium symmetry and a Law of
Large Numbers.
The precision of the unbiased signal of θ from the perspective of an external observer, which we denote
by τ epˆ , is the relevant measure of price informativeness. As in the benchmark model, price informativeness
is given by
τ epˆ =
(
αs
αh
)2
τδ.
We can then establish a new irrelevance result.
portfolio sensitivities vary in that case, they do so symmetrically, allowing us to find another irrelevance result. There is scope
for further research on the interaction of how trading costs affect price informativeness when investors are heterogeneous
in their dynamic trading considerations.
18Our extensions with linear and fixed trading costs are a standalone contribution by itself. To our knowledge, this is
the first paper to solve for a Rational Expectations Equilibrium (REE) with many investors and linear trading costs, which
endogenously generate inaction regions. Formally, the closest results are those of Yuan (2005, 2006), who solves a REE
with kinked asset demands.
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Theorem 5. (Irrelevance theorem with linear trading costs) In an economy with linear trading
costs, when investors are ex-ante identical, price informativeness in any equilibrium is independent of
the level of trading costs. Formally, the precision of the unbiased signal about the fundamental revealed
by the asset price τ epˆ does not depend on c.
Theorem 5 shows that our irrelevance argument is not specific to assuming quadratic trading costs,
applying also when trading costs are linear. Interestingly, when trading costs are linear, an increase
in trading costs is associated with a reduction in trading on both intensive and extensive margins –
some investors cease to trade altogether.19 However, because the decrease in trading at the extensive
margin reduces both fundamental and hedging trades in equal proportions, price informativeness remains
unchanged. It is trivial to prove the more general irrelevance result with both linear and quadratic trading
costs, given by φ |∆q1i|+ c2 |∆q1i|2.
6.2 Fixed trading costs
In this extension, we consider an alternative form of the trading cost. We now assume that investors face
a fixed cost of trading Φ ≥ 0 and normalize q0 = 0. Formally, investors’ budget constraint now satisfies
w2i = n2i + q1iθ − q1ip− Φ · 1 [∆q1i 6= 0] . (26)
The problem solved by investors ceases to be convex in q1i. Nonetheless, it’s possible to conjecture and
verify that the investors’ optimal portfolio choice satisfies
∆q1i =

E[θ|si,hi,p]−γhi−p
γVar[θ|si,hi,p] , if W (∆q1i 6= 0) > W (∆q1i = 0)
0, otherwise,
where W = γ2Var [θ|si, hi, p] (∆q1i)2 − Φ · 1 [∆q1i 6= 0]. In a symmetric equilibrium in linear strategies,
the portfolio demands of active investors and the equilibrium price satisfy familiar conditions
∆q1i = αssi − αhhi − αpp+ ψ
p = αs
αp
θ − αh
αp
δ + ψ
αp
,
where αs, αh, and αp are positive scalars. As in the case with linear costs, our equilibrium
characterization exploits symmetry and a Law of Large Numbers.
We can then establish a new irrelevance result.
Theorem 6. (Irrelevance theorem with linear trading costs) In an economy with linear trading
costs, when investors are ex-ante identical, price informativeness in any equilibrium is independent of
the level of trading costs. Formally, the precision of the unbiased signal about the fundamental revealed
by the asset price τ epˆ does not depend on c.
19No-trade regions emerge because investors whose initial asset holdings are close to their optimal level of asset holdings
experience a second-order welfare gain from adjusting their portfolios, but face a first-order welfare loss caused by the linear
cost. When trading costs are quadratic, the welfare loss is second-order, so it is optimal for (almost) every investor to have
a non-zero net trading position.
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Intuitively, with fixed trading costs and homogeneous investors, the set of investors whose gains from
trading are smaller ceases to trade altogether and become inactive. Those investors whose gains from
trading are larger find optimal to pay the fixed cost of trading and submit the same demands as if
the faced no trading costs. In this case, an increase in trading costs only has effects on the extensive
margin, but not on investors’ intensive margin. Since the extensive margin reduction on trading affects
fundamental and hedging trades in equal proportions, price informativeness remains unchanged.
6.3 Random heterogeneous priors
In this extension, we add an alternative form of noise: privately known random heterogeneous priors that
co-move in the aggregate. There are different ways to justify heterogeneity in priors: they may capture
intrinsic differences in beliefs (optimistic versus pessimistic investors), they may be the result of having
observed different private signals in the past, or, in some situations, they can also reflect heterogeneous
private valuations for the risky asset. We preserve the structure of the symmetric benchmark model,
but introduce stochastic heterogeneous priors as follows.20
From the point of view of investor i, the payoff of the risky asset is distributed according to
θ ∼ N
(
θi, τ
−1
θ
)
,
where θi denotes the prior expected value for investor i, which is also stochastic and distributed according
to
θi = θ + εui,
where
εui ∼ N
(
0, τ−1u
)
and θ ∼ N
(
µθ, τ
−1
θ
)
.
This formulation implies that the realized average prior mean is unknown, introducing a new source
of aggregate uncertainty in addition to the aggregate hedging need and the payoff of the risky asset.
Importantly, we assume that investors take their priors as given and do not use them to learn about the
priors of others investors. For this reason, we could allow for heterogeneity in the precision of stochastic
heterogeneous priors τui without affecting the irrelevance result.
The demand for the risky asset of every investor i is given by the solution to
max
q1i
(Ei [θ]− γhi − p) q1i − γ2Vari [θ] q
2
1i −
c
2 (∆q1i)
2 ,
where we denote the asset payoff posterior expected mean and variance for investor i by Ei [θ] ≡
E
[
θ|θi, si, hi, p
]
and Vari [θ] = Vari
[
θ|θi, si, hi, p
]
.
In a symmetric equilibrium in linear strategies, we postulate net demand functions given by
∆q1i = αθθi + αssi − αhhi − αpp+ ψ,
where αθ, αs, αh, and αp are positive scalars, while ψ can take positive or negative values.
20See Scheinkman and Xiong (2003) or Davila (2014) for models with trading costs and heterogeneous priors.
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In contrast to the benchmark model, ∆q1i also depends on the individual realization of the
heterogeneous prior θi. Market clearing in the asset market implies that the equilibrium price takes
the form
p = αθ
αp
θ + αs
αp
θ − αh
αp
δ − ψ
αp
.
In this case, the asset price depends on both the aggregate level of prior heterogeneity θ, and the actual
payoff realization θ.
The variance of the unbiased signal of θ from the perspective of an external observer, which we denote
by
(
τ epˆ
)−1
and whose inverse we adopt as the relevant measure of price informativeness, is given by
(
τ epˆ
)−1
=
(
αs
αθ
)2
τ−1
θ
+
(
αs
αh
)2
τ−1δ .
Unlike in the benchmark model, even if there are no trading motives due to differences in hedging needs,
i.e., τδ = 0, the price of the risky asset is not fully revealing. This occurs because there is a new source of
aggregate uncertainty coming from the average level of prior heterogeneity in the economy. Therefore, as
long as either τθ or τδ are non-zero, the equilibrium price is not be fully revealing. In fact, when τδ = 0,
the equilibrium of this model always exists and is unique, which makes the model with heterogeneous
beliefs a tractable benchmark.
Theorem 7. (Irrelevance theorem with random heterogeneous priors) In an economy in which
investors have random heterogeneous priors, when investors are ex-ante identical, price informativeness
in any equilibrium is independent of the level of trading costs. Formally, the precision of the unbiased
signal about the fundamental revealed by the asset price τ epˆ does not depend on c.
Theorem 7 shows that our irrelevance argument is not specific to assuming hedging needs as the
source of aggregate uncertainty. We can show that when hedging needs are not random, the model with
random heterogeneous priors always has a unique equilibrium. This occurs because investors do not
learn about the aggregate noise component of prices, which eliminates the strategic complementarities
in investors’ choices, since priors are fixed after they are realized. In this dimension, the model is even
more tractable than our benchmark model. The logic behind Theorem 7 is similar to one behind Theorem
1. An increase in the level of trading costs equally reduces trading due to informational reasons and
trading due to heterogeneity in priors, leaving price informativeness unchanged.
6.4 Strategic investors
In this extension, we assume an alternative market structure in which there are a finite number of
investors who behave strategically.21 In particular, we modify our symmetric benchmark model by
assuming there are a finite number of investorsN who internalize the effect of their demand on prices. We
focus on equilibria in linear strategies in which strategic investors submit demand functions, conditional
21Both competitive and strategic models are used as frameworks to study trading in financial markets. See Vives (2008)
for a recent overview of models of strategic behavior in financial markets.
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on the price p. Modeling strategic behavior allows us to study the role of liquidity provision in more
detail.
The demand for the risky asset of every investor i is given by the solution to
max
q1i
(E [θ|si, hi, p]− γhi − p−i) q1i − γ2Var [θ|si, hi, p] (q1i)
2 + p−iq0 − c2 (∆q1i)
2 , (27)
where p−i, a function of q1i, corresponds to the residual demand faced by investor i given the portfolio
choices of all other investors.
The first order condition of this problem yields the following net demand for the risky asset
∆q1i =
E [θ|si, hi, p]− γhi − p− γVar [θ|si, hi, p] q0
γVar [θ|si, hi, p] + c+ ∂p−i∂q1i
. (28)
This expression is identical to the one in the benchmark model, with the exception of the price impact
term ∂p−i∂q1i , which we show is positive in equilibrium. The term corresponding to the price impact of
investors is similar to the one corresponding to the trading cost c. In fact, the term c + ∂p−i∂q1i enters
symmetrically into investors’ portfolio decisions, with the caveat that ∂p−i∂q1i is an equilibrium object while
c is a primitive of the model.
In a symmetric equilibrium in linear strategies, we postulate net demand functions given by
∆q1i = αssi − αhhi − αpp+ ψ,
where αs, αh, and αp are positive scalars, while ψ can take positive or negative values.
Market clearing in the asset market,∑Ni=1 ∆q1i = 0, implies that the equilibrium price takes the form
p = αs
αp
(
θ +
∑N
j=1 ε
M
sj
N
)
− αh
αp
(
δ +
∑N
j=1 ε
M
hj
N
)
+ ψ
αp
,
An important input for the investors’ portfolio demands is the residual price elasticity, given by ∂p−i∂q1i ,
which takes the value
∂p−i
∂q1i
= 1∑
j 6=i αp
= 1(N − 1)αp > 0.
In the strategic case, the inference problem solved by investors must account for the non-negligible effect
that the signal of investor i has on the asset price. The variance of the unbiased signal of θ from the
perspective of an external observer, which we denote by
(
τ epˆ
)−1
and whose inverse we adopt as the
relevant measure of price informativeness, is given by(
τ epˆ
)−1
=
(
αh
αs
)2(
τ−1δ +
τ−1h
N
)
+ τ
−1
s
N
. (29)
In the strategic case, the equilibrium price is not fully revealing even when τδ → ∞. This result
is driven by the fact that the individual signals regarding the fundamental and the individual hedging
needs do not cancel out in the aggregate when there is a finite number of investors.
Theorem 8. (Irrelevance theorem with strategic investors) In an economy in which investors are
strategic, when investors are ex-ante identical, price informativeness in any equilibrium is independent of
the level of trading costs. Formally, the precision of the unbiased signal about the fundamental revealed
by the asset price τ epˆ does not depend on c.
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Theorem 8 shows that our irrelevance argument does not depend on the assumption of perfect
competition. Strategic investors tend to trade more conservatively to limit the price impact and the
informational impact of their trades. However, as long as investors are ex-ante identical, changes in
the level of trading costs equally affect their trading sensitivities to information and to hedging needs,
leaving price informativeness unchanged. Theorem 8 also shares the logic of Theorem 1.
6.5 General utility and signal structure
We have conducted most of our analysis within the CARA-Gaussian framework, which, given its
tractability, allows us to provide a full characterization of the equilibrium. Our final irrelevance result
relaxes the parametric assumptions on the structure of the private signals and endows investors with
more general preferences. This new result allows us to identify which key properties of our benchmark
model are crucial for our irrelevance results to hold in a model with ex-ante identical investors, while
sidestepping the issues associated with explicitly characterizing the model’s equilibrium.22 The role of
this extension is to highlight the importance of ex-post homogeneity in investors’ demand sensitivities
to information and noise for our irrelevance results. In table 2 in the Appendix, we provide an exact
mapping between our benchmark formulation and the general formulation presented in this section.
We start by assuming that investors are heterogeneous, and then proceed to find which specific
symmetry conditions are needed for our irrelevance result to hold. In particular, we assume that investors
receive a private signal si and a hedging need hi that take the form
si = fsi (θ, ε)
hi = fhi (δ, ε) ,
where θ and δ are random variables that represent the fundamental and the aggregate hedging need, and
ε corresponds to a vector of errors. We assume that the functions fsi (·) and fhi (·), which are potentially
investor specific, are differentiable.
We now assume that the problem solved by investors can be written as
max
q1i
U i (q1i, p, si, hi, c) ,
where U i (·) is a well-behaved function. The variable c represents the magnitude of the trading costs.
We do not impose restrictions on the functional form of trading costs. The solution to this problem
yields an optimality condition of the form
U iq (q1i, p, si, hi, c) = 0, (30)
which implicitly defines a demand functions q1i (p, si, hi, c). Eq. (30) allows for heterogeneity in investor
preferences.
22A complete characterization of the (set of) equilibrium(a) in this section is beyond the scope of this paper, and would
be a significant contribution by itself. We can nonetheless make claims that apply whenever a given equilibrium exists.
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The market clearing condition, i.e.,
´
∆q1i (p, si, hi, c) di = 0, implies that we can express the
equilibrium price as
p
({
fsi (θ, ε)
}
i
,
{
fhi (δ, ε)
}
i
, c
)
,
where we denote the collections of private signals and hedging needs by
{
f si (θ, ε)
}
i and
{
fhi (δ, ε)
}
i
.
At this level of generality, it is not possible to find a explicit representation for the conditional
variance of the fundamental asset value θ given the asset price. Thus, we use instead a more general
measure of price informativeness, defined by
Π ≡
∣∣∣∂p∂θ ∣∣∣∣∣∣∂p∂δ ∣∣∣ .
In our benchmark model, Π exactly corresponds to αsαh , which is a monotonic transformation of the
conditional variance of the fundamental given the asset price. Intuitively, this definition captures the
relative sensitivity of the price to a change in the aggregate fundamental relative to a change in aggregate
noise. When Π is high, observing the asset price reveals the value of the fundamental precisely, and vice
versa.
Exploiting market clearing, we can express price informativeness as
Π =
∣∣∣´ ∂q1i∂si ∂fsi∂θ di∣∣∣∣∣∣´ ∂q1i∂hi ∂fhi∂δ di∣∣∣ . (31)
Therefore, for our irrelevance result to be valid, it is necessary and sufficient that this object remains
independent of the trading cost c, for any level of c. We have already established that cross-sectional
heterogeneity across investors can break the irrelevance result. In Theorem 9, we identify the key
conditions behind our irrelevance result when investors are ex-ante identical.
Theorem 9. (Irrelevance theorem for general utility and signal structure) In an economy
with ex-ante identical investors with general preferences and signal structure, price informativeness is
independent of the level of trading costs in a symmetric equilibrium when Π, defined in Eq. (31), is
independent of the level of trading costs. Under the plausible assumption that ∂fs∂θ and
∂fh
∂δ are independent
of c and constant, the effect of trading costs on price informativeness exclusively depends on the aggregate
differential response to trading costs of the demand sensitivities to information and noise, that is,
sgn
(
dΠ
dc
)
= sgn
d log
(∣∣∣´ ∂q1i∂si di∣∣∣)
dc
−
d log
(∣∣∣´ ∂q1i∂hi di∣∣∣)
dc
 . (32)
In terms of marginal utilities, dΠdc is zero locally at any equilibrium, if and only if
∂2U i(qi;si,hi,p,c)
∂q2i
=
∂2Uj(qi;si,hi,p,c)
∂q2j
, ∀i, j, ∂2U i(qi;si,hi,p,c)∂qi∂si =
∂2U i(qi;si,hi,p,c)
∂qi∂si
, ∀i, and ∂2U i(qi;si,hi,p,c)∂qi∂hi =
∂2U i(qi;si,hi,p,c)
∂qi∂hi
, ∀i.
In general, we expect ∂fsi∂θ and
∂fhi
∂δ to be independent of c: there is no reason to believe that a change
in trading costs should affect the structure of the exogenous signals.23 From Eq. (31) and Eq. (32), it
23As shown in Section 5, trading costs affect the structure of the signals when investors have an ex-ante information
choice.
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becomes clear that the key condition for the irrelevance result is that average ex-post demand sensitivities
to information and noise respond symmetrically on the aggregate to a change in trading costs. In the
CARA-Gaussian case, ex-ante symmetry implies ex-post symmetry, consistent with our new finding.
However, more generally, having ex-ante identical investors is not sufficient for the irrelevance result to
hold. If ex-ante identical investors are ex-post heterogeneous regarding their demand sensitivities to the
fundamental signal and the noise signal, trading costs may affect price informativeness, according to Eq.
(32). Hence, Theorem 9 highlights that the key sufficient statistics that determine the response of price
informativeness to trading costs are the average ex-post demand sensitivities to information ∂q1i∂si and
hedging ∂q1i∂hi .
Because only aggregates matter, one could think of a model in which ex-post demand sensitivities
respond differently to the trading costs across the population, but the aggregate effect cancels out. Given
that the solution to the mean-variance model is a first-order approximation to more general problems,
we conjecture that some form of approximate ex-post symmetry must hold when investors are ex-ante
identical.
7 Conclusion
This paper provides a systematic analysis of the effects of trading costs on information aggregation and
information acquisition in financial markets. An elementary and intuitive set of irrelevance results
emerges from our analysis: when investors are ex-ante identical, changes in trading costs equally
discourage trading on both information and hedging needs, leaving price informativeness unchanged.
This result holds for different forms of trading costs, alternative formulations of aggregate noise, and
competitive and strategic environments. Up to a first-order, they will apply to any model of financial
market trading. We have also shown that trading costs discourage the acquisition of information, which
tends to reduce price informativeness.
Although we have already explored in this paper how several dimensions of heterogeneity determine
the effect of trading costs on the informational role of financial markets, there is scope to study how
alternative departures from our symmetric benchmarks better describe the effects of varying trading
costs in alternative models of trading in financial markets. This is a fruitful avenue for future research.
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Appendix
Information structure for constant conditional covariance
We assume that Cov (θ, n2i| si, hi, p) = hi for all information sets. The formulation in the main text is isomorphic
to the following information structure. Let us expand the asset payoff in the following way. Let v = θ + z be the
fundamental value of the asset, where θ ∼ N (θ, τ−1θ ) is the learnable component of asset value and z ∼ N (0, τ−1z )
is the unlearnable part and θ and z are independent. Let n2i = hiz + uni. Then, since Cov (θ, n2i) = 0 and
Cov (v, n2i) = hiτ−1z , we have
Cov (v, n2i| si, hi, p) = hiτ−1z
for all{si, hi, p} since there is no information about z in {si, p}.
An investor’s problem in this case is
max
q1i
(
E [θ|si, hi, p]− γihiτ−1z − p
)
q1i − γi2
(
Var [θ|si, hi, p] + τ−1z
)
q21i −
c
2 (∆q1i)
2
.
In this case, the net demand for the asset for an investor i is
∆q1i =
E [θ|si, hi, p]− γihiτ−1z − p
γiVar [θ|si, hi, p] + γiτ−1z + c
− q0i,
which is isomorphic to the investor facing a trading cost of γiτ−1z +c while changing the scale of the hedging needs.
Consequently, this specification yields the same results as the more parsimonious specification that we adopt in
the main body of the paper.
Proofs: Section 3
Investors’ portfolio problem
Under the assumptions of CARA utility and normal uncertainty, an investor i solves the following mean-variance
problem
max
q1i
E [w2i]− γi2 Var [w2i] ,
where w2i is given by Eq. (5) in the text. After getting rid of constants, investor i solves Eq. (6) in the text, with
an optimality condition given by
q1i =
γiVar [θ|si, hi, p]
γiVar [θ|si, hi, p] + c︸ ︷︷ ︸
≡ωi(c)
E [θ|si, hi, p]− γihi − p
γiVar [θ|si, hi, p]︸ ︷︷ ︸
≡qˆ1i
+ c
γiVar [θ|si, hi, p] + c︸ ︷︷ ︸
≡1−ωi(c)
q0i
= ωi (c) qˆ1i + (1− ωi (c)) q0i.
The demand elasticity of investor i is given by ∂q1i∂p = − 1γiVar[θ|si,hi,p]+c . We can write the net risky asset demand
by investor i as
∆q1i = ωi (c) (qˆ1i − q0i) .
Equilibrium with ex-ante identical investors
In a symmetric equilibrium in linear strategies in which all investors are ex-ante identical, we guess (and verify)
that the optimal net asset demand of investor i takes the form
∆q1i = αssi − αhhi − αpp+ ψ, (A.1)
where αs, αh and αp are positive scalars, and ψ can take positive and negative values. The market clearing
condition
´
∆q1idi = 0 implies that the equilibrium price takes the form
p = αs
αp
θ − αh
αp
δ + ψ
αp
, (A.2)
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where we use the notation αs, αh, αp, and ψ to emphasize that prices are a function of aggregates. In equilibrium
αs = αs, αh = αh, αp = αp, and ψ = ψ. We assume a Strong Law of Large Numbers, as described in the Appendix
of Vives (2008), to be able to write
´
sidi = θ and
´
hidi = δ in Eq. (A.2). Hence, using the distributions of θ
and δ, defined in Eq. (2) and Eq. (4) in the text, we can write the unconditional distribution of the equilibrium
price p as
p ∼ N
(
αs
αp
θ + ψ
αp
,
(
αs
αp
)2
τ−1θ +
(
αh
αp
)2
τ−1δ
)
.
While the conditional distribution of the equilibrium price p given the fundamental θ follows
p|θ ∼ N
(
αs
αp
θ + ψ
αp
,
(
αh
αp
)2
τ−1δ
)
.
We denote by pˆ = αpαs p −
ψ
αs
the unbiased signal of θ for a given external observer (denoted by e), which is
distributed as follows
pˆ|θ ∼ N
(
θ,
(
τepˆ
)−1)
, where τepˆ =
(
αs
αh
)2
τδ. (A.3)
We define τpˆ as the precision of the information contained in the price for an individual investor, which incorporates
the information conveyed by the hedging realization. Formally pˆ+ αhαs
τh
τδ+τhhi = θ − αhαs (δ − E [δ|hi]), where
pˆ+ αh
αs
τh
τδ + τh
hi
∣∣∣∣ θ ∼ N (θ, τ−1pˆ ) , where τpˆ = (αsαh
)2
(τδ + τh) .
Solving the optimal filtering problem – as described in the Online Appendix – from the perspective of investor i
allows us to write
E [θ|si, hi, p] =
τθθ + τssi + τpˆ
(
pˆ+ αhαs E [δ|hi]
)
τθ + τs + τpˆ
, where E [δ|hi] = τh
τδ + τh
hi, (A.4)
Var [θ|si, hi, p] = 1
τθ + τs + τpˆ
. (A.5)
The expected value and the variance of θ, conditional on private signals and equilibrium prices, are the inputs to
the portfolio decision of investors, as described in Eq. (7) in the text.
We define κ, to simplify notation, as
κ ≡ γVar [θ|si, hi, p] + c.
Matching coefficients with our initial guess in Eq. (A.1), we show that αs, αh, αp, and ψ must satisfy
αs =
1
κ
τs
τθ + τs + τpˆ
, (A.6)
αh =
1
κ
(
γ − τh
τθ + τs + τpˆ
αs
αh
)
, (A.7)
αp =
1
κ
τs
τs + τpˆ
, and (A.8)
ψ = αp
(
τθ
τθ + τs + τpˆ
θ − γVar [θ|si, hi, p] q0
)
. (A.9)
Combining Eq. (A.6) and Eq. (A.7) allows us to characterize αsαh , and consequently τpˆ, τ
e
pˆ , and Var [θ|si, hi, p], as
a function of primitives. The solution to the following cubic on x determines the equilibrium values of αsαh
F (x) := γ (τδ + τh)x3 − τhx2 + γ (τs + τθ)x− τs = 0. (A.10)
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Figure A.1: Illustration of cubic equation (A.10)
Lemma 1. (Existence and multiplicity)
Proof. Because F (x) is continuous, F (0) < 0, and limx→∞ F (x) = ∞, it follows from the intermediate value
theorem that there exists at least one real positive solution to F (x) = 0. Using the properties of a cubic function,
it is straightforward to show that the slope of the function F (·), Fx ≡ dFdx = 3γ (τδ + τh)x2 − 2τhx + γ (τs + τθ),
is non-positive only for the middle equilibria in case of multiplicity, but positive otherwise. Figure A.1 illustrates
the possible multiple solutions of Eq. (A.10), by plotting F
(
αs
αh
)
.
To establish the stability of the solution, the cubic can be expressed in the form of a (change in the) best
response as
∆
(
αs
αh
)
:= αs
αh
− αs
αh
= τs
γ (τδ + τh)
(
αs
αh
)2
− τh αsαh + γ (τθ + τs)
− αs
αh
.
It follows that the middle root is always unstable, because ∆′ (·) > 0. It also follows that one can find a specific
equilibrium convergence process that makes the lower and higher equilibria stable, because ∆′ (·) < 0.
The following comparative statics results on τθ and τδ are valid for any solution
∂
(
αs
αh
)
∂τθ
= −γ
αs
αh
Fx
< 0 and
∂
(
αs
αh
)
∂τδ
= −
γ
(
αs
αh
)3
Fx
< 0.
The comparative statistics on γ, τs, and τh are given by
∂
(
αs
αh
)
∂γ
= −
(τδ + τh)
(
αs
αh
)3
+ (τs + τθ) αsαh
Fx
,
∂
(
αs
αh
)
∂τs
= − γ
Fx
(
αs
αh
− 1
γ
)
, and
∂
(
αs
αh
)
∂τh
= − γ
Fx
(
αs
αh
− 1
γ
)(
αs
αh
)2
.
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It can be easily shown that all solutions to Eq. (A.10) satisfy αsαh <
1
γ , which implies the following sign for the
comparative statics in the high and low equilibria
∂
(
αs
αh
)
∂γ
< 0,
∂
(
αs
αh
)
∂τs
> 0, and
∂
(
αs
αh
)
∂τh
> 0.
In the middle equilibrium, these three comparative statics are reversed.
The comparative statistics on price informativeness for an external observer follow from those of αsαh , with the
exception of ∂τ
e
pˆ
∂τδ
, which can be positive or negative
∂τepˆ
∂τδ
= 2αs
αh
τδ +
(
αs
αh
)2 ∂ ( αsαh)
∂τδ
R 0.
A full characterization of the equilibrium price also requires finding the ratios αsαp ,
αh
αp
, and ψαp . These are
respectively given by
αs
αp
= τs + τpˆ
τθ + τs + τpˆ
, (A.11)
αh
αp
=
γ −
αs
αh
τh
τθ+τs+τpˆ
τs
τs+τpˆ
, and (A.12)
ψ
αp
= τθ
τθ + τs + τpˆ
θ − γVar [θ|si, hi, p] q0 (A.13)
The first term in the expression for ψαp contains an expected payoff and the second term has a risk premium
correction. Although we do not emphasize this result in our statement of Theorem 1, given that ψαp is independent
of c, we can conclude that asset prices, not only asset price informativeness and volatility, are invariant to the
level of trading costs.
The equilibrium price can thus be written as
p = τs + τpˆ
τθ + τs + τpˆ
θ + τθ
τθ + τs + τpˆ
θ − γ
(
1
τs
τs+τpˆ
δ + Var [θ|si, hi, p] q0
)
+
αs
αh
τh
τθ+τs+τpˆ
τs
τs+τpˆ
δ,
where the unconditional expectation of the price corresponds to E [p] = θ− γVar [θ|si, hi, p] q0. We can thus write
the asset price in a given equilibrium as
p = E [p] + αs
αp
(
θ − θ)− αh
αp
δ.
Finally, by combining Eq. (A.1) and Eq. (A.2), we can write the net change in investor i’s equilibrium portfolio
position as
∆q1i = αs (si − θ)− αh (hi − δ) = αsεsi − αhεhi.
The equation αs (si − θ)− αh (hi − δ) = 0 represents a straight line in the space si × hi, with slope dhidsi = αsαh . It
denotes the (measure zero) set of investors who decide not to trade. Investors above this line are sellers of the
risky asset, while investors below this line are buyers of the risky asset. Given that the distributions of si and
hi are uncorrelated and symmetric, half of the investors will be buyers for any realization of signals and hedging
needs, while the other half will be sellers. We can therefore establish that ∆q1i ∼ N
(
0, α2sτ−1s + α2hτ
−1
h
)
. The
distribution of |∆q1i| is a half-normal, with a mean Var [∆q1i]
√
2
pi . Using a Strong Law of Large Numbers, we
can write volume exactly in a given equilibrium as
V = 12
ˆ
|∆q1i| di = 1√2pi
(
α2sτ
−1
s + α2hτ−1h
) 1
2 .
Theorem 1. (Irrelevance theorem with ex-ante identical investors)
Proof. It suffices to show that αsαh is independent of c. The solution to Eq. (A.10) does not depend on c, which
proves our claim.
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Equilibrium with ex-ante heterogeneous investors
In the equilibrium in linear strategies with ex-ante heterogeneous investors, we guess and verify that the optimal
portfolio of investor i takes the form
∆q1i = αsisi − αhihi − αpip+ ψi, (A.14)
where αsi, αhi, and αpi are positive scalars for every investor and ψi can take positive or negative values. The
market clearing condition
´
∆q1idi = 0 implies that the equilibrium price takes the form
p = αs
αp
θ − αh
αp
δ + ψ
αp
,
where we define
αs =
ˆ
αsidi, αh =
ˆ
αhidi, αp =
ˆ
αpidi, and ψ ≡
ˆ
ψidi.
A Strong Law of Large Numbers guarantees that
´
αsiεsidi→ 0 and
´
αhiεhidi→ 0 almost surely, so that we can
write
´
αsisidi = αsθ and
´
αhihidi = αhδ.
Hence, we can write the distribution of the price p as
p ∼ N
(
αs
αp
θ + ψ
αp
,
(
αs
αp
)2
τ−1θ +
(
αh
αp
)2
τ−1δ
)
.
While the conditional distribution of the equilibrium price p given the fundamental θ follows
p|θ ∼ N
(
αs
αp
θ + ψ
αp
,
(
αh
αp
)2
τ−1δ
)
.
We denote by pˆ = αpαs p −
ψ
αs
the unbiased signal of θ for a given external observer (denoted by e), which is
distributed as follows
pˆ|θ ∼ N
(
θ,
(
τepˆ
)−1) where τepˆ = (αsαh
)2
τδ.
We define τpˆi as the precision of the information contained in the price for an individual investor, which incorporates
the information conveyed by the hedging realization. Formally
pˆ+ αh
αs
τhi
τδ + τhi
hi
∣∣∣∣ θ ∼ N (θ, τ−1pˆi ) where τpˆi = (αsαh
)2
(τδ + τhi) .
Solving the optimal filtering problem – as described in the Online Appendix – from the perspective of investor i
allows us to write
E [θ|si, hi, p] =
τθθ + τsisi + τpˆi
(
pˆ+ αhαs E [δ|hi]
)
τθ + τsi + τpˆi
, where E [δ|hi] = τhi
τδ + τhi
hi (A.15)
Var [θ|si, hi, p] = 1
τθ + τsi + τpˆi
. (A.16)
When needed, we define τθ|si,hi,p = 1Var[θ|si,hi,p] = τθ + τsi + τpˆi. To simplify the notation, we define
κi ≡ γiVar [θ|si, hi, p] + c = γi
τθ|si,hi,p
+ c.
Matching coefficients with our guess in Eq. (A.14), we characterize αsi, αhi, αpi, and ψi as the solution to the
following system of equations
αsi =
1
κi
τsi
τθ + τsi + τpˆi
, αhi =
1
κi
(
γi − αs
αh
τhi
τθ + τsi + τpˆi
)
,
αpi =
1
κi
(
1− τpˆi
τθ + τsi + τpˆi
αp
αs
)
, and ψi =
1
κi
(
1
τθ + τsi + τpˆi
(
τθθ − τpˆi ψ
αs
)
− γiVar [θ|si, hi, p] q0i
)
.
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The cross sectional averages, which matter for the determination of demands and prices, are given by
αs =
ˆ 1
κi
τsi
τθ + τsi + τpˆi
di, αh =
ˆ 1
κi
(
γi − αs
αh
τhi
τθ + τsi + τpˆi
)
di,
αp =
1
1 +
´ τpˆi
τsi
αsidi
αs
ˆ 1
κi
di, and ψ = αp
ˆ τθ
τθ+τsi+τpˆi θ − γiVar [θ|si, hi, p] q0i
κi
κ
di
where we define κ =
(´ 1
κi
di
)−1
.
As in the symmetric case, a full characterization of the equilibrium hinges on finding the equilibrium value of
αs
αh
. In this case, it is given by the solution to the following nonlinear equation in αsαh
1
αs
αh
=
´ 1
κi
(
γi − αsαh
τhi
τθ+τsi+τpˆi
)
di´ 1
κi
τsi
τθ+τsi+τpˆi
di
=
´ γi− αsαh τhiτθ+τsi+τpˆi
γiVar[θ|si,hi,p]+c di´ 1
γiVar[θ|si,hi,p]+c
τsi
τθ+τsi+τpˆi
di
=
´ γi−
αs
αh
τhi
τθ+τsi+
(
αs
αh
)2
(τδ+τhi)
γi
τθ+τsi+
(
αs
αh
)2
(τδ+τhi)
+c di
´ 1
γi
τθ+τsi+
(
αs
αh
)2
τδ
+c
τsi
τθ+τsi+
(
αs
αh
)2
(τδ+τhi)
di
.
From our analysis of the symmetric case, we conjecture and find numerically that this equation may have
multiple solutions – in our simulations, we choose values of γ sufficiently high/low so that there exists a unique
solution. Once the equilibrium value of αsαh is determined, τpˆi and τθ|si,hi,p are uniquely pinned down. It follows
immediately that, if κi is constant, αsαh is independent of c for any value of c. The reverse result is also true: only
when κi = κ, αsαh is independent of c for any value of c. Therefore,
αs
αh
is independent of c if and only if κi = κ, ∀i.
Theorem 2. (One-dimensional heterogeneity)
Proof. From Theorem 3b, we know that
sgn
(
dτepˆ
dc
)
= − sgn
(
Covi
[
αsi
αs
− αhi
αh
,
1
κi
])
.
With two groups of investors with measures µA and µB , the relevant cross-sectional covariance corresponds to
Covi
[
αsi
αs
− αhi
αh
,
1
κi
]
= µA
κA
µB
κB
αhAαhB
αsαh
(
αsA
αhA
− αsB
αhB
)
(κB − κA) .
So finding the sgn
(
dτepˆ
dc
)
is identical to finding sgn
((
αsA
αhA
− αsBαhB
)
(κB − κA)
)
. Without loss of generality we can
assume that κB > κA. This is the same as assuming one directional deviations in the following ways for three
different possibilities of one-dimensional heterogeneity: i) γB > γA, τsA = τsB = τs and τhA = τhB = τh , ii)
τsA > τsB , γA = γB = γ and τhA = τhB = τh, or iii) τhA > τhB , γA = γB = γ and τsA = τsB = τs. So finding the
sgn
(
dτepˆ
dc
)
becomes identical to finding sgn
(
αsA
αhA
− αsBαhB
)
.
For each of the three cases involving one directional deviations, it is the case that sgn
(
αsA
αhA
− αsBαhB
)
respectively
corresponds to: i) − sgn
(
∂
(
αsi
αhi
)
∂γi
)
, ii) sgn
(
∂
(
αsi
αhi
)
∂τsi
)
, and iii) sgn
(
∂
(
αsi
αhi
)
∂τhi
)
. We establish in the Online Appendix
that sgn
(
∂
(
αsi
αhi
)
∂γi
)
< 0, sgn
(
∂
(
αsi
αhi
)
∂τsi
)
> 0, sgn
(
∂
(
αsi
αhi
)
∂τsi
)
> 0, which implies that sgn
(
dτepˆ
dc
)
< 0.
Theorem 3. (Two-dimensional heterogeneity and general directional effects of trading costs
with ex-ante heterogeneous investors)
Proof. a) From Theorem 3b, we know that
sgn
(
dτepˆ
dc
)
= − sgn
(
Covi
[
αsi
αs
− αhi
αh
,
1
κi
])
.
39
With two groups of investors with measures µA and µB , the relevant cross-sectional covariance corresponds to
Covi
[
αsi
αs
− αhi
αh
,
1
κi
]
= µA
κA
µB
κB
αhAαhB
αsαh
(
αsA
αhA
− αsB
αhB
)
(κB − κA) .
So finding the sgn
(
dτepˆ
dc
)
is identical to finding sgn
((
αsA
αhA
− αsBαhB
)
(κB − κA)
)
. Since κi = γiVar [θ|si, hi, p] + c we
have
∂κi
∂γi
> 0, ∂κi
∂τsi
< 0, ∂κi
∂τhi
< 0.
Moreover, we establish in the Online Appendix that sgn
(
∂
(
αsi
αhi
)
∂γi
)
< 0, sgn
(
∂
(
αsi
αhi
)
∂τsi
)
> 0, sgn
(
∂
(
αsi
αhi
)
∂τsi
)
> 0.
Then, for all economies in which
(γA − γB) (τsA − τsB) < 0 and τhA = τhB
or
(γA − γB) (τhA − τhB) < 0 and τsA = τsB
or
(τhA − τhB) (τsA − τsB) > 0 and γA = γB
we have sgn
(
dτepˆ
dc
)
< 0. Since Covi
[
αsi
αs
− αhiαh , 1κi
]
is continuous in τsi, τhi, and γi, sgn
(
dτepˆ
dc
)
< 0 for over half of
the parameter space when there is two-dimensional heterogeneity.
Proof. b) We show in the Online Appendix that
d log
(
αs
αh
)
dc is given by
d log
(
αs
αh
)
dc
=
d
(
αs
αh
)
dc
αs
αh
=
Covi
[
αsi
αs
− αhiαh ,− 1κi
]
1 + 2
´ 1
κi
(
γi
κi
1
τθ|si,hi,p
+ cαsiαs
)
τpˆ
τθ|si,hi,p
di
.
Eq. (19) follows immediately.
Proofs: Section 5
In this section, we focus on the equilibria in which pi ∈ {0, 1} to simplify the notation and the analysis. All the
arguments extend for the cases in which pi ∈ (0, 1). We make these arguments explicit as necessary.
Endogenous precision of the signal about the fundamental
Investor i chooses τsi solves maxτsi E [vi]− λ (τsi), where E [vi] is given by
E [vi] = E [(E [θ|si, hi, p]− γhi − p)]E [q∗1i] + Cov [(E [θ|si, hi, p]− γhi − p) , q∗1i]− 12 (γVar [θ|si, hi, p] + c)E
[
(q∗1i)2
]
= Cov [(E [θ|si, hi, p]− γhi − p) , q∗1i]− 12 (γVar [θ|si, hi, p] + c)E
[
(q∗1i)2
]
,
where we use the fact that E [(E [θ|si, hi, p]− γhi − p)] =
(
θ − E [p])E [q∗1i] = 0, given the assumption that
q0i = 0.24
The optimal precision choice τ∗si is given by the solution to H (τ∗si) = 0, where
H (τsi) ≡ ∂Cov [(E [θ|si, hi, p]− γhi − p) , q
∗
1i]
∂τsi
+ γ2Var [θ|si, hi, p]
2 Var [q∗1i]− 12 (γVar [θ|si, hi, p] + c)
∂Var [q∗1i]
∂τsi
− λ′ (τsi) .
The expression H (τsi) can be rewritten as
H (τsi) =
1
2
∂Cov [(E [θ|si, hi, p]− γhi − p) , q∗1i]
∂τsi
− λ′ (τsi) ,
24As described in Veldkamp (2009), we are assuming that investors’ preferences correspond to E [ui (E [Ui (w2i) |si, p, hi])],
where Ui (w2i) = −e−γiw2i and ui (x) = − ln (−x).
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where we use the following two relations
∂Cov [(E [θ|si, hi, p]− γhi − p) , q∗1i]
∂τsi
= (γVar [θ|si, hi, p] + c) ∂Var [q
∗
1i]
∂τsi
− γVar [θ|si, hi, p]2 Var [q∗1i] ,
∂Var [θ|si, hi, p]
∂τsi
= Var [θ|si, hi, p]2 .
The second order condition of the information choice problem is given by
∂H (τsi)
∂τsi
= ∂
2Cov [(E [θ|si, hi, p]− γhi − p) , q∗1i]
∂τ2si
− λ′′ (τsi) < 0,
which is strictly negative, guaranteeing that the first order condition is necessary and sufficient for optimality,
since
∂2Cov [(E [θ|si, hi, p]− γhi − p) , q∗1i]
∂τ2si
= −2 Var [θ|si, hi, p]
γVar [θ|si, hi, p] + c
∂Cov [(E [θ|hi, si, p]− γhi − p) , q∗1i]
∂τsi
c < 0,
which uses the fact that
∂Cov [(E [θ|hi, si, p]− γhi − p) , q∗1i]
∂τsi
= 1
γ
ω2i
[
Var [E [θ|hi, si, p]− γhi − p] + Var [θ|si, hi, p] + 1
γ
c
]
> 0,
where ωi is defined in Eq. (9) in the text.
Equilibrium
Lemma 2. (Existence and symmetry of equilibrium)
Proof. Since all investors are infinitesimal, any two investors face the same first order condition, given the choices
of all other investors. Because the objective function is strictly concave in the precision of the investor’s private
information in all its domain, there is at most one solution to the first order condition. Therefore, any two investors
make the same precision choice and any equilibrium has to be symmetric. This argument establishes that any
equilibrium must be symmetric.
For a given equilibrium of the trading stage we know that H (τsi) is continuous in τsi ∈ (0,∞),
limτsi→0H (τsi) = ∞, and limτsi→∞H (τsi) = −∞. If there is a unique equilibrium in the trading game it
follows from the intermediate value theorem that there is always a solution to the first order condition H (τsi) = 0.
If there are multiple equilibria, there always exists a probability pi such that
piH (τsi) + (1− pi)H (τsi) = 0,
where H (·) and H (·) are the first order conditions of the investor when the high and low equilibria in the trading
game are played with probability 1, respectively.
Finally, in a symmetric equilibrium,
∂τ∗si
∂τs
∣∣∣∣
τ∗
si
=τs
=
∂H(τsi)
∂τs
∣∣∣
τ∗
si
=τs
− ∂H(τsi)∂τsi
∣∣∣
τ∗
si
=τs
< 0,
which implies that the equilibrium is unique. It is thus sufficient to show that ∂H(τsi)∂τs
∣∣∣
τ∗
si
=τs
< 0. From the
definition of H (·)
∂H (τsi)
∂τs
= ∂
2Cov [(E [θ|hi, si, p]− γhi − p) , q∗1i]
∂τsi∂τs
.
In a symmetric equilibrium,
∂2Cov [(E [θ|hi, si, p]− γhi − p) , q∗1i]
∂τsi∂τs
∣∣∣∣
τ∗
si
=τs
=
= −2 γVar [θ|si, hi, p]
3
(γVar [θ|si, hi, p] + c)2
αh
αs
(
2
(
Cov [(E [θ|hi, si, p]− γhi − p) , q∗1i] + 1γi
)
c
+Var [θ|si, hi, p] τpˆi + Var [θ|hi, si, p] τsτθ+τs+τpˆ
)
∂
(
αs
αh
)
∂τs
.
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Figure A.2: Best responses for different sunspot values pi/trading costs c
The sign of
∂
(
αs
αh
)
∂τs
determines whether information acquisition choices are strategic complements or substitutes.
Since in both stable equilibria
∂
(
αs
αh
)
∂τs
> 0, there is a unique equilibrium in the information choice game given
the equilibrium sunspot. This highlights that the multiplicity of equilibria in the information acquisition game
comes directly from the multiplicity in the trading game and not from strategic complementarities in information
acquisition.
Theorem 4. (Effect of trading costs with endogenous precision of the signal on the
fundamental)
Proof. The implicit function theorem implies that for any equilibrium in the trading stage
dτ∗si
dc
=
∂H(τsi)
∂c
−∂H(τsi)∂τsi
< 0,
because
∂H (τsi)
∂c
= ∂
2Cov [(E [θ|hi, si, p]− γhi − p) , q∗1i]
∂τsi∂c
= −ω
2
i
γ
(
2Cov [(E [θ|hi, si, p]− γhi − p) , q∗1i] +
1
γ
)
< 0.
Since in any sunspot equilibria the first order condition is a linear combination of the first order condition for
the case in which each equilibria is played with probability one, the first result follows. The second result follows
directly from the fact that
∂
(
αs
αh
)
∂τs
> 0 in both stable equilibria.
The left plot of Figure A.2 illustrates best responses for a given c, while varying the sunspot probability pi.
The right plot of Figure A.2 illustrates best responses for a given sunspot probability pi, while varying the level of
trading costs.
Proofs: Section 6
Linear trading costs
Investor i wealth is given by w2i = n2i + q1iθ + q0ip− q1ip− φ |∆q1i|. Investor i solves the well-behaved problem
stated in Eq. (22), with the necessary and sufficient condition for optimality given in Eq. (23). Note that the
optimal portfolio demand can be written as
q1i =
E [θ|si, hi, p]− γhi − p− φ sgn (∆q1i)
E [θ|si, hi, p]− γhi − p︸ ︷︷ ︸
≡w1i
E [θ|si, hi, p]− γhi − p
γVar [θ|si, hi, p]︸ ︷︷ ︸
≡qˆ1i
.
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The distributions of p, p|θ, and pˆ|θ, as well as the conditional moments E [θ|si, hi, p] and Var [θ|si, hi, p] take
identical expressions as in the benchmark model. Matching coefficients with our guess in Eq. (24), we show that
αs, αh, αp, ψ+, and ψ− must satisfy
αs =
1
κ
τs
τθ + τs + τpˆ
, αh =
1
κ
(
γ − τh
τθ + τs + τpˆ
αs
αh
)
, αp =
1
κ
τs
τs + τpˆ
,
ψ+ = αp
(
τθ
τθ + τs + τpˆ
θ − γVar [θ|si, hi, p] q0 − φ
)
, and
ψ− = αp
(
τθ
τθ + τs + τpˆ
θ − γVar [θ|si, hi, p] q0 + φ
)
,
where κ ≡ γVar [θ|si, hi, p]. It follows that
ψ− + ψ+
2 = αp
(
τθ
τθ + τs + τpˆ
θ − γVar [θ|si, hi, p] q0
)
.
Note that asset prices behave identically in the models with linear and quadratic costs. The cubic equation in
(A.10) characterizes again the equilibrium.
Theorem 5. (Irrelevance theorem with linear trading costs)
Proof. It suffices to show that αsαh is independent of c. The proof is identical to the one of Theorem 1.
Fixed trading costs
When trading, investors’ problem is identical to the problem solved in the baseline case. The cubic equation in
(A.10) characterizes again the equilibrium of the model. In this case, in a given equilibrium, investor i’s indirect
utility satisfies
W = max
q1i
(E [θ|si, hi, p]− γhi − p) q1i − γ2Var [θ|si, hi, p] q
2
1i − Φ · 1 [∆q1i 6= 0] .
= γ2Var [θ|si, hi, p] (q
?
1i)
2 − Φ · 1 [∆q1i 6= 0] ,
where q?1i satisfies q∗1i = αsεsi − αhεhi if non-zero. The set of active investors is given by
|αsεsi − αhεhi| ≥
√√√√(τθ + τs + (αs
αh
)2
(τδ + τh)
)
2Φ
γ
.
Theorem 6. (Irrelevance theorem with fixed trading costs)
Proof. It suffices to show that αsαh is independent of c. The proof is identical to the one of Theorem 1.
Random heterogeneous priors
Given the realization of his prior, investor i solves
max
q1i
(
E
[
θ|θi, si, hi, p
]− γhi − p) q1i − γ2Vari [θ|θi, si, hi, p] q21i − c2 (∆q1i)2 .
Investor i optimal net portfolio demand is given by
∆q1i =
E
[
θ|θi, si, hi, p
]− p− γhi − γVari [θ|θi, si, hi, p] q0
γVari
[
θ|θi, si, hi, p
]
+ c
.
In a symmetric equilibrium in linear strategies in which all investors are ex-ante identical, we guess (and verify)
that the optimal net asset demand of investor i takes the form
∆q1i = αθθi + αssi − αhhi − αpp+ ψ.
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Market clearing implies an equilibrium price of the form
p = αθ
αp
θ + αs
αp
θ − αh
αp
δ + ψ
αp
.
We denote by pˆ = αpαs p − αθαsµθ −
ψ
αs
the unbiased signal of θ for a given external observer (denoted by e), which
is distributed as follows
pˆ|θ ∼ N
(
θ,
(
τepˆ
)−1) where (τepˆ)−1 = (αθαs
)2
τ−1
θ
+
(
αh
αs
)2
τ−1δ .
The solution to the optimal filtering problem implies that
E
[
θ|θi, si, hi, pˆ
]
=
τθθi + τssi + τpˆ
(
pˆ+ αhαs
τh
τh+τδ
hi
)
τθ + τs + τpˆ
and Var
[
θ|θi, si, hi, pˆ
]
= 1
τθ + τs + τpˆ
,
where
τ−1pˆ =
(
αθ
αs
)2
τ−1
θ
+
(
αh
αs
)2
(τδ + τh)−1 .
Matching coefficients with our initial conjecture, we show that αθ, αs, αp, αh, and ψ must satisfy
αθ =
1
κ
τθ
τθ + τs + τpˆ
, αh =
1
κ
(
γ − τpˆ
τθ + τs + τpˆ
αh
αs
τh
τh + τδ
)
αs =
1
κ
τs
τθ + τs + τpˆ
, αp =
1
κ
τs
τs + τpˆ
, and ψ = αp
(
τpˆ
τs
τθ
τθ + τs + τpˆ
µθ − γVar
[
θ|θi, si, p
]
q0
)
,
where we define κ = γVar
[
θ|θi, si, hi, pˆ
]
+ c.
Theorem 7. (Irrelevance theorem with random heterogeneous priors)
Proof. It suffices to show that αθαs and
αh
αs
are independent of c. We can write
αθ
αs
= τθ
τs
and αh
αs
=
γ − τpˆτθ+τs+τpˆ αhαs τhτh+τδ
τs
τθ+τs+τpˆ
.
Both ratios are independent of the trading cost c, because τpˆ, which is a function of αhαs , is independent of c.
Strategic investors
Investor i solves the well-behaved problem stated in Eq. (27), with the necessary and sufficient condition for
optimality given in Eq. (28)
In a symmetric equilibrium in linear strategies, investors portfolio demands take the form
∆q1i = αssi − αhhi − αpp+ ψ.
The equilibrium price implied by market clearing is given by
p = αs
αp
θ − αh
αp
δ + ψ
αp
+ αs
αp
∑N
j=1 ε
M
sj
N
− αh
αp
∑N
j=1 ε
M
hj
N
,
where we use αs, αh, αp, and ψ to denote the equilibrium choices of other investors. In this case, the residual
demand for investor i is given by
p−i =
∑
j 6=i αssj∑
j 6=i αp
−
∑
j 6=i αhhj∑
j 6=i αp
+
∑
j 6=i ψ∑
j 6=i αp
+ ∆qi∑
j 6=i αp
.
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which allows us to write the price impact term for investor i as
∂p−i
∂q1i
= 1∑
j 6=i αp
= 1(N − 1)αp .
The unconditional distribution of the equilibrium price p is given by
p ∼ N
(
αs
αp
θ + ψ
αp
,
(
αs
αp
)2
τ−1θ +
(
αh
αp
)2
τ−1δ +
(
αs
αp
)2
τ−1s
N
+
(
αh
αp
)2
τ−1h
N
)
.
We denote by pˆ = αpαs p −
ψ
αs
the unbiased signal of θ for a given external observer (denoted by e), which is
distributed as follows
pˆ|θ ∼ N
(
θ,
(
τepˆ
)−1)
, where
(
τepˆ
)−1 = (αh
αs
)2(
τ−1δ +
τ−1h
N
)
+ τ
−1
s
N
.
Solving the filtering problem of strategic investors involves an adjustment to account for investor i’s own signal.
We the denote the unbiased signal in prices from the perspective of investor i, pˆi, by
pˆi =
αp
αs
p− ψ
αs
− 1
αs
∆q1i
N − 1 =
∑
j 6=i
sj − αh
αs
∑
j 6=i
hj .
The information contained in the price for an investor i also corrects for the fact that hi contains information
about δ. The following signal is given by
pˆi +
αh
αs
τh
τh + τδ
hi
∣∣∣∣ θ ∼ N (θ, τ−1pˆi ) ,
where the price informativeness from the perspective of an investor i is given by(
τpˆi
)−1
=
(
αh
αs
)2(
(τh + τδ)−1 +
τ−1h
N − 1
)
+ τ
−1
s
N − 1
Matching coefficients with the guess we get the following system of equations for the set of parameters we
conjectured:
αs =
1
κˆ
τs
τθ + τs + τpˆ
, αh =
1
κˆ
(
γ − τpˆiαh
αs
τh
τh + τδ
)
, αp =
1
κˆ
(
1− τpˆi
τθ + τs + τpˆi
αp
αs
)
, and
ψ = 1
κˆ
(
1
τθ + τs + τpˆi
(
τθθ − τpˆi ψ
αs
)
− γVar [θ|si, hi, p] q0
)
,
where we define
κˆ = γVar [θ|si, hi, p] + c+ 1
N − 1
1
αs
τpˆi
τθ + τs + τpˆi
+ 1(N − 1)αp .
Compared to the competitive case, the scale effect κˆ is dampened by the pecuniary price impact ∂p−i∂q1i =
1∑
j 6=i αpj
=
1
(N−1)αp > 0 and the informational price impact
1
N−1
1
αs
τpˆi
τθ+τs+τpˆi
. Formally, κˆ > κ, which makes strategic investors
less reluctant to trade.
Theorem 8. (Irrelevance theorem with strategic investors)
Proof. It suffices to show that αsαh is independent of c. We can write
αs
αh
=
τs
τθ+τs+τpˆi
γ − τpˆi αhαs τhτh+τδ
,
which is independent of c, because τpˆi, which depends on
αs
αh
as shown in Eq. (29), is not a function of c.
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General utility and signals
From the expression for the equilibrium price, we show that
∂p
∂θ
=
´
∂q1i
∂si
∂fsi
∂θ di´
∂q1i
∂p di
and ∂p
∂δ
=
´
∂q1i
∂hi
∂fhi
∂δ di´
∂q1i
∂p di
,
which implies Eq. (31) in the text. Table 2 provides a comparison between the general case and the benchmark
model with ex-ante identical investors.
Table 2: Equivalence between general and benchmark models
General model Benchmark model
U (p, si, hi, c, q1i) (E [θ|si, hi, p]− γihi − p) q1i − γi2 Var [θ|si, hi, p] q21i − c2 (∆q1i)2
∆q1i (p, si, hi, c) ∆q1i = αssi − αhhi − αpp+ ψ
p ({si} , {hi} , c) p = αsαp θ −
αh
αp
δ + ψαp
∂p
∂θ ,
∂p
∂δ
αs
αp
, −αhαp
| ∂p∂θ |
| ∂p∂δ |
αs
αh
Theorem 9. (Irrelevance theorem for general utility and signal structure)
Proof. Because investors may be ex-post heterogeneous, we cannot conclude in general that
´
∂q1i
∂si
di = ∂q1i∂si . When
∂fsi
∂θ =
∂fhi
∂δ = 1, we can find instead
d log Π
dc
=
d log
(∣∣∣´ ∂q1i∂si di∣∣∣)
dc
−
d log
(∣∣∣´ ∂q1i∂hi di∣∣∣)
dc
=

∣∣∣∣´ d ∂q1i∂sidc di∣∣∣∣∣∣∣´ ∂q1i∂si di∣∣∣ −
∣∣∣∣´ d ∂q1i∂hidc di∣∣∣∣∣∣∣´ ∂q1i∂hi di∣∣∣
 ,
which corresponds to Eq. (32) in the text.
Note that we can express Π in a given equilibrium as
Π =
∣∣∣∂p∂θ ∣∣∣∣∣∣∂p∂δ ∣∣∣ =
´
 ∂2Ui(qi;si,hi,p,c)∂qi∂si
∂2Ui(qi;si,hi,p,c)
∂q2
i
 ∂si
∂θ di
´
 ∂2Ui(qi;si,hi,p,c)∂qi∂hi
∂2Ui(qi;si,hi,p,c)
∂q2
i
 ∂hi
∂δ di
, (A.17)
so the relevant conditions on primitives that guarantee at a given equilibrium that price informativeness is invariant
to the level of trading costs are
∂2U i (qi; si, hi, p, c)
∂q2i
= ∂
2U j (qj ; sj , hj , p, c)
∂q2j
, ∀i, j
∂2U i (qi; si, hi, p, c)
∂qi∂si
= ∂
2U i (qi; si, hi, p, c)
∂qi∂si
, ∀i
∂2U i (qi; si, hi, p, c)
∂qi∂hi
= ∂
2U i (qi; si, hi, p, c)
∂qi∂hi
, ∀i.
In that case, |
∂p
∂θ |
| ∂p∂δ | is independent of the level of trading costs in the economy since the signal and hedging needs
structures are independent of the trading cost. In particular, these conditions hold when investors’ optimality
conditions satisfy
∂Uˆ i (qi; si, hi, p)
∂qi
− ∂C (qi)
∂qi
= 0 and ∂Uˆ
2i (qi; si, hi, p)
∂q2i
− ∂
2C (qi)
∂q2i
= ∂Uˆ
2i (qi; sj , hj , p)
∂q2j
− ∂
2C (qj)
∂q2j
∀i, j.
46
References
Abel, Andrew B, Janice C Eberly, and Stavros Panageas. 2013. “Optimal inattention to the
stock market with information costs and transactions costs.” Econometrica, 81(4): 1455–1481.
Admati, A.R. 1985. “A noisy rational expectations equilibrium for multi-asset securities markets.”
Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society, 629–657.
Albagli, Elias, Aleh Tsyvinski, and Christian Hellwig. 2012. “A theory of asset prices based on
heterogeneous information.” Working Paper.
Amihud, Yakov, and Haim Mendelson. 1986. “Asset pricing and the bid-ask spread.” Journal of
Financial Economics, 17(2): 223–249.
Bai, Jennie, Thomas Philippon, and Alexi Savov. 2015. “Have financial markets become more
informative?” Journal of Financial Economics, Forthcoming.
Barlevy, Gadi, and Pietro Veronesi. 2000. “Information acquisition in financial markets.” The
Review of Economic Studies, 67(1): 79–90.
Barro, R.J. 1974. “Are government bonds net wealth?” The Journal of Political Economy, 82(6): 1095–
1117.
Biais, B., L. Glosten, and C. Spatt. 2005. “Market microstructure: A survey of microfoundations,
empirical results, and policy implications.” Journal of Financial Markets, 8(2): 217–264.
Bond, Philip, Alex Edmans, and Itay Goldstein. 2012. “The Real Effects of Financial Markets.”
Annual Review of Financial Economics, 4(1): 339–360.
Breon-Drish, Bradyn. 2015. “On existence and uniqueness of equilibrium in a class of noisy rational
expectations models.” The Review of Economic Studies.
Budish, Eric, Peter Cramton, and John Shim. 2015. “The High-Frequency Trading Arms
Race: Frequent Batch Auctions as a Market Design Response.” Quarterly Journal of Economics,
130(4): 1547–1621.
Chabakauri, Georgy, Kathy Yuan, and Konstantinos Zachariadis. 2015. “Multi-Asset Noisy
Rational Expectations Equilibrium with Contingent Claims.” Working Paper.
Constantinides, G.M. 1986. “Capital market equilibrium with transaction costs.” The Journal of
Political Economy, 842–862.
Dang, Tri Vi, and Florian Morath. 2015. “The Taxation of Bilateral Trade with Endogenous
Information.” Working Paper.
Davila, Eduardo. 2014. “Optimal Financial Transaction Taxes.” Working Paper, NYU Stern.
Davila, Eduardo, and Cecilia Parlatore. 2017. “Price Informativeness and Price Volatility.”Working
Paper, NYU Stern.
Diamond, D.W., and R.E. Verrecchia. 1981. “Information aggregation in a noisy rational
expectations economy.” Journal of Financial Economics, 9(3): 221–235.
Dow, James, and Rohit Rahi. 2000. “Should Speculators Be Taxed?” The Journal of Business,
73(1): 89–107.
47
Farboodi, Maryam, and Laura Veldkamp. 2016. “The Long-Run Evolution of the Financial Sector.”
Working Paper.
Ganguli, Jayant Vivek, and Liyan Yang. 2009. “Complementarities, multiplicity, and supply
information.” Journal of the European Economic Association, 7(1): 90–115.
Gârleanu, Nicolae, and Lasse Heje Pedersen. 2013. “Dynamic trading with predictable returns
and transaction costs.” The Journal of Finance, 68(6): 2309–2340.
Gârleanu, Nicolae, Stavros Panageas, and Jianfeng Yu. 2014. “Financial Entanglement: A
Theory of Incomplete Integration, Leverage, Crashes, and Contagion.” Working Paper.
Goldstein, Itay, Yan Li, and Liyan Yang. 2014. “Speculation and hedging in segmented markets.”
Review of Financial Studies, 27(3): 881–922.
Greenwood, Robin, and Andrei Shleifer. 2013. “Expectations of Returns and Expected Returns.”
NBER Working Paper.
Greenwood, Robin, and David Scharfstein. 2013. “The growth of finance.” The Journal of
Economic Perspectives, 3–28.
Grossman, Sandford. 1976. “On the efficiency of competitive stock markets where trades have diverse
information.” Journal of Finance, 31(2): 573–585.
Grossman, S.J., and J.E. Stiglitz. 1980. “On the impossibility of informationally efficient markets.”
The American Economic Review, 393–408.
Hatchondo, Juan Carlos, Per Krusell, and Martin Schneider. 2014. “Asset trading and valuation
with uncertain exposure.”
Hellwig, Christian, and Laura Veldkamp. 2009. “Knowing what others know: Coordination motives
in information acquisition.” The Review of Economic Studies, 76(1): 223–251.
Hellwig, M.F. 1980. “On the aggregation of information in competitive markets.” Journal of Economic
Theory, 22(3): 477–498.
Huang, Chi-fu, and Robert H Litzenberger. 1988. Foundations for financial economics. Vol. 4,
North-Holland New York.
Ingersoll, J.E. 1987. Theory of financial decision making. Vol. 3, Rowman & Littlefield Pub
Incorporated.
Krueger, Dirk, and Hanno Lustig. 2010. “When is Market Incompleteness Irrelevant for the Price
of Aggregate Risk (and when is it not)?” Journal of Economic Theory, 145(1): 1–41.
Kyle, A.S. 1989. “Informed speculation with imperfect competition.” The Review of Economic Studies,
56(3): 317–355.
Lucas, Robert E. 1976. “Econometric policy evaluation: A critique.” Carnegie-Rochester conference
series on public policy, 1: 19–46.
Manzano, Carolina, and Xavier Vives. 2011. “Public and private learning from prices,
strategic substitutability and complementarity, and equilibrium multiplicity.” Journal of Mathematical
Economics, 47(3): 346–369.
Modigliani, F., and M.H. Miller. 1958. “The cost of capital, corporation finance and the theory of
investment.” The American economic review, 48(3): 261–297.
48
Philippon, Thomas. 2015. “Has the US Finance Industry Become Less Efficient? On the Theory and
Measurement of Financial Intermediation.” American Economic Review, 105(4): 1408–38.
Scheinkman, Jose A, and Wei Xiong. 2003. “Overconfidence and Speculative Bubbles.” Journal of
Political Economy, 111(6).
Stiglitz, J.E. 1989. “Using tax policy to curb speculative short-term trading.” Journal of Financial
Services Research, 3(2): 101–115.
Subrahmanyam, A. 1998. “Transaction Taxes and Financial Market Equilibrium.” The Journal of
Business, 71(1): 81–118.
Summers, L.H., and V.P. Summers. 1989. “When financial markets work too well: a cautious case
for a securities transactions tax.” Journal of financial services research, 3(2): 261–286.
Turley, Robert. 2012. “Informative Prices and the Cost of Capital Markets.” Working Paper.
Van Nieuwerburgh, Stijn, and Laura Veldkamp. 2010. “Information acquisition and under-
diversification.” The Review of Economic Studies, 77(2): 779–805.
Vayanos, D., and J.L. Vila. 1999. “Equilibrium interest rate and liquidity premium with transaction
costs.” Economic theory, 13(3): 509–539.
Vayanos, Dimitri. 1998. “Transaction costs and asset prices: A dynamic equilibrium model.” Review
of Financial Studies, 11(1): 1–58.
Vayanos, Dimitri, and Jiang Wang. 2012. “Market Liquidity - Theory and Empirical Evidence.”
Foundations and Trends Journal Articles, 6(4): 221–317.
Veldkamp, Laura. 2009. “Information Choice in Macroeconomics and Finance.” Manuscript, New York
University.
Verrecchia, Robert E. 1982. “Information acquisition in a noisy rational expectations economy.”
Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society, 1415–1430.
Vives, Xavier. 2008. Information and Learning in Markets: the Impact of Market Microstructure.
Princeton University Press.
Vives, Xavier. 2016. “Endogenous public information and welfare.” Review of Economic Studies,
Forthcoming.
Wallace, Neil. 1981. “A Modigliani-Miller theorem for open-market operations.” The American
Economic Review, 71(3): 267–274.
Yuan, K. 2005. “Asymmetric price movements and borrowing constraints: a rational expectations
equilibrium model of crises, contagion, and confusion.” The Journal of Finance, 60(1): 379–411.
Yuan, Kathy. 2006. “The Price Impact of Borrowing and Short-Sale Constraints.” Working Paper.
49
Online Appendix (not for publication)
A Filtering
Investors observe two pieces of information about the fundamental θ, the private signal si and the public signal
p. Moreover, the realization of their individual hedging need reveals information about the aggregate hedging
need in the economy δ and, thus, about the noise contained in the price. In the equilibrium in linear strategies,
the unbiased signal of the fundamental contained in the price can be summarized in pˆ = θ − αhαs δ. The linear
system that characterizes the unknown fundamentals and the information observed by an individual investor is
the following  sihi
pˆ
 =
 1 00 1
1 −αhαs
[ θ
δ
]
+
 1 00 1
0 0
[ εsi
εhi
]
where [
θ
δ
]
∼ N
([
θ
0
]
,
[
τ−1θ 0
0 τ−1δ
])
and [
εsi
εhi
]
∼ N
([
0
0
]
,
[
τ−1si 0
0 τ−1hi
])
.
A standard application of the Kalman filter yields
E
[[
θ
δ
]∣∣∣∣ si, hi, p] = 1τθ + τsi + τpˆi
[
τθθ + τsisi + τpˆipˆ+ αsαh τhihi
τhihi − αhαs (τsi + τθ) pˆ+ αhαs τsisi + αhαs τθθ
]
and
Var
[[
θ
δ
]∣∣∣∣ si, hi, p] = 1τθ + τsi + τpˆi
 1 αsαh
αs
αh
(
αs
αh
)2

where
τpˆi =
(
αs
αh
)2
(τδ + τhi) and τpˆ =
(
αs
αh
)2
τδ.
Note that we can write E [θ| si, hi, p] as follows
E [θ| si, hi, p] =
τθθ + τsisi + τpˆipˆ+ αsαh τhihi
τθ + τsi + τpˆi
=
τθθ + τsisi + τpˆi
(
pˆ+ 1αs
αh
τhi
τδ+τhihi
)
τθ + τsi + τpˆi
,
where E [δ|hi] = τhiτδ+τhihi.
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B Proof of Theorem 3: auxiliary results
B.1 Derivation of
d
(
αs
αh
)
dc
The sign of
d
(
αs
αh
)
dc can be determined as follows. We can write
d
(
αs
αh
)
dc
= αs
αh
[
d logαs
dc
− d logαh
dc
]
= αs
αh
[´
dαsi
dc di
αs
−
´
dαhi
dc di
αh
]
= αs
αh
ˆ (αhi
αh
− αsi
αs
) dκi
κi
dc
di−
ˆ
αsi
αs
dτθ|si,hi,p
τθ|si,hi,p
dc
di+
ˆ 1
κi
τhi
τθ + τsi + τpˆi
αs
αh
(
2 τpˆ
τθ|si,hi,p
+ 1
) d( αsαh )
dc
αs
αh
di

= αs
αh
ˆ (αhi
αh
− αsi
αs
)
1
κi
di−
ˆ (
αhi
αh
− αsi
αs
) 1
κi
γi
τθ|si,hi,p
dτθ|si,hi,p
τθ|si,hi,p
dc
 di− ˆ αsi
αs
dτθ|si,hi,p
τθ|si,hi,p
dc
di

= αs
αh
ˆ (αhi
αh
− αsi
αs
)
1
κi
di−
ˆ
αhi
αh
 1
κi
γi
τθ|si,hi,p
dτθ|si,hi,p
τθ|si,hi,p
dc
 di+ ˆ αsi
αs
(
1
κi
γi
τθ|si,hi,p
− 1
) dτθ|si,hi,p
τθ|si,hi,p
dc

= αs
αh
ˆ (αhi
αh
− αsi
αs
)
1
κi
di−
ˆ
αhi
αh
1
κi
γi
τθ|si,hi,p
dτθ|si,hi,p
τθ|si,hi,p
dc
di− c
ˆ
αsi
αs
1
κi
dτθ|si,hi,p
τθ|si,hi,p
dc

Therefore
d
(
αs
αh
)
dc
αs
αh
=
ˆ (αhi
αh
− αsi
αs
)
1
κi
di−
ˆ (
γi
κi
1
τθ|si,hi,p
+ cαsi
αs
1
κi
)
2 τpˆ
τθ|si,hi,p
di
d
(
αs
αh
)
dc
αs
αh

=
− ´ (αsiαs − αhiαh ) 1κi di
1 + 2
´ 1
κi
(
γi
κi
1
τθ|si,hi,p
+ cαsiαs
)
τpˆi
τθ|si,hi,p
di
Where we use the following results
d logαs
dc
=
dαs
dc
αs
=
´
dαsi
dc di
αs
and d logαh
dc
=
dαh
dc
αh
=
´
dαhi
dc di
αh
dαsi
dc
= − 1
κ2i
dκi
dc
τsi
τθ + τsi + τpˆi
− 1
κi
τsi
(τθ + τsi + τpˆi)2
dττθ|si,hi,p
dc
= −αsi
 dκiκi
dc
+
dτθ|si,hi,p
τθ|si,hi,p
dc

dαhi
dc
= − 1
κ2i
dκi
dc
(
γi − αs
αh
τhi
τθ + τsi + τpˆi
)
− 1
κi
dτθ|si,hi,p
dc
τhi
αs
αh
+ τhi
τθ + τsi + τpˆi
d
(
αs
αh
)
dc

= −αhi
dκi
κi
dc
− 1
κi
τhi
τθ + τsi + τpˆi
αs
αh
 dτθ|si,hi,pτθ|si,hi,p
dc
+
d
(
αs
αh
)
dc
αs
αh

dκi
dc
= 1− γi(
τθ|si,hi,p
)2 dτθ|si,hi,pdc = 1− γiτθ|si,hi,p
dτθ|si,hi,p
τθ|si,hi,p
dc
⇒
dκi
dc
κi
= 1
κi
1− γi
τθ|si,hi,p
dτθ|si,hi,p
τθ|si,hi,p
dc

dτθ|si,hi,p
dc
= dτpˆi
dc
= 2
(
αs
αh
) d( αsαh)
dc
(τδ + τhi)⇒
dτθ|si,hi,p
τθ|si,hi,p
dc
= 2
(
αs
αh
) d( αsαh)
dc
(τδ + τhi) = 2
τpˆi
τθ|si,hi,p
d
(
αs
αh
)
dc
αs
αh
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Finally, we can write
´
αsi
κi
di
αs
−
´
αhi
κi
di
αh
=
Ei
[
αsi
1
κi
]
αs
−
Ei
[
αhi
1
κi
]
αh
=
Ei [αsi]Ei
[
1
κi
]
+ Covi
[
αsi,
1
κi
]
αs
−
Ei [αhi]Ei
[
1
κi
]
+ Covi
[
αhi,
1
κi
]
αh
= Covi
[
αsi
αs
,
1
κi
]
− Covi
[
αhi
αh
,
1
κi
]
= Covi
[
αsi
αs
− αhi
αh
,
1
κi
]
So the sign of
d
(
αs
αh
)
dc is determined by
sgn
d
(
αh
αs
)
dc
 = − sgn(´ αsiκi di
αs
−
´
αhi
κi
di
αh
)
= sgn
(
Covi
[
αsi
αs
− αhi
αh
,− 1
κi
])
Because
d log
(
αs
αh
)
dc
=
d
(
αs
αh
)
dc
αs
αh
=
Covi
[
αsi
αs
− αhiαh ,− 1κi
]
1 + 2
´ 1
κi
(
γi
κi
1
τθ|si,hi,p
+ cαsiαs
)
τpˆ
τθ|si,hi,p
di
B.2 Auxiliary results for part b)
First, for case i), it is straightforward to establish that αsiαhi is a decreasing monotone function of γi. Formally
∂
(
αsi
αhi
)
∂γi
= −
τsi
(
τθ + τsi +
(
αs
αh
)2
(τδ + τhi)
)
(
γi
(
τθ + τsi +
(
αs
αh
)2
(τδ + τhi)
)
− τhi αsαh
)2 < 0 ∀γi.
Therefore
∂
(
αsi
αhi
)
∂γi
< 0.
Second, for case ii),
∂
(
αsi
αhi
)
∂τsi
formally corresponds to
∂
(
αsi
αhi
)
∂τsi
=
γ
(
τθ +
(
αs
αh
)2
(τδ + τh)
)
− τh αsαh(
γτsi + γ
(
τθ +
(
αs
αh
)2
(τδ + τh)
)
− τh αsαh
)2 ,
which implies that
sgn
∂
(
αsi
αhi
)
∂τsi
 = sgn(γ(τθ + (αs
αh
)2
(τδ + τh)
)
− τh αs
αh
)
= sgn
(
1
γ
− αsi
αhi
)
,
where the last equality follows from the fact that
γ
(
τθ +
(
αs
αh
)2
(τδ + τh)
)
− τh αs
αh
= Vari [θ|si, hi, p]−1
(
γ −
(
τh
αs
αh
+ γτsi
)
Vari [θ|si, hi, p]
)
= Vari [θ|si, hi, p]−1 γκiαhi
(
1
γ
− αsi
αhi
)
.
Since we show in Claim 2 that 1γ − αsiαhi > 0, this establishes that
∂
(
αsi
αhi
)
∂τsi
> 0.
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Third, for case iii),
∂
(
αsi
αhi
)
∂τhi
formally corresponds to
∂
(
αsi
αhi
)
∂τhi
= − γ
αs
αh
(
αs
αh
− 1γ
)
τsiγ + γ
(
τθ+
(
αs
αh
)2
(τδ+τhi)
)
−τhi αsαh
τsA
2
= −
(
αsi
αhi
)2
γ
τsi
αs
αh
(
αs
αh
− 1
γ
)
,
which implies that
sgn
∂
(
αsi
αhi
)
∂τhi
 = sgn( 1
γ
− αs
αh
)
.
Since we show in Claim 1 that 1γ − αsαh > 0, this establishes that
∂
(
αsi
αhi
)
∂τhi
> 0.
Two final claims complete our argument. Note first that
αs
αh
= µAαsA + µBαsB
µAαhA + µBαhB
= wA
αsA
αhA
+ wB
αsB
αhB
(A.18)
where
wi =
µiαhi
µAαhA + µBαhB
with wA + wB = 1.
Claim 1. Let γA = γB = γ. Then, αsαh <
1
γ .
Proof. Using the definition of αsi and αhi we know that
1
γ
>
αsi
αhi
(A.19)
if and only if
τθ +
(
αs
αh
)2
(τδ) +
αs
αh
τhi
(
αs
αh
− 1
γ
)
> 0.
Assume that αsαh >
1
γ . Then, Eq. (A.19) holds for i = A,B and Eq. (A.18) implies
αs
αh
< 1γi which is a
contradiction.
Claim 2. Let γA = γB = γ, τhA = τhB = τh and τsA > τsB . Then, αsAαhA <
1
γ .
Proof. We know that
sgn
∂
(
αsA
αhA
)
∂τsA
 = sgn( 1
γA
− αsA
αhA
)
= sgn
(
τθ +
(
αs
αh
)2
(τδ) +
αs
αh
τh
(
αs
αh
− 1
γ
))
which is independent of τsA. Suppose αsAαhA >
1
γ . Then,
∂
(
αsA
αhA
)
∂τsA
< 0 and since τsA > τsB , this implies
αsB
αhB
>
1
γ
and using Eq. (A.18) we would have
αs
αh
>
1
γ
which contradicts Claim 1.
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C Equilibrium with classic noise trading
For the question we study, it is important that we introduce aggregate hedging needs to have a meaningful
filtering problem, as opposed to modeling directly some form of “noise demand”. In particular, what matters for
our irrelevance result is that the source of noise that makes the filtering problem non trivial affects the primitives
of the portfolio problem solved by investors.
Here, we eliminate the aggregate uncertainty arising from hedging needs and solve our model using the more
standard stochastic noisy demand for the risky asset. We specifically work with the symmetric competitive
benchmark model, and we further assume that τhi = ∞ and δ = 0. We introduce noise traders, modeled as a
random variable x, such that
x ∼ N (0, τ−1x )
These assumptions prevent the equilibrium from being fully revealing. We guess and verify that investors’ portfolio
demands take the form
∆q1i = αssi − αpp+ ψ, (A.20)
where αs and αp are positive scalars and ψ can take positive or negative values. The market clearing condition´
∆q1idi+ x = 0 implies an equilibrium price of the form
p = αs
αp
θ + ψ
αp
+ x
αp
We can write the distribution of the price p as
p ∼ N
(
αs
αp
θ + ψ
αp
,
(
αs
αp
)2
τ−1θ +
(
1
αp
)2
τ−1x
)
While the conditional distribution of the equilibrium price p given the fundamental θ follows
p|θ ∼ N
(
αs
αp
θ + ψ
αp
,
(
1
αp
)2
σ2x
)
We again denote by pˆ = αpαs p−
ψ
αs
the unbiased signal of θ, which is distributed as follows
pˆ|θ ∼ N
(
θ, τ−1pˆ
)
, where τpˆ = (αp)2 τx (A.21)
As in our benchmark model
E [θ|si, p] = E [θ|si, pˆ] = τθθ + τssi + τpˆpˆ
τθ + τs + τpˆ
and Var [θ|si, p] = Var [θ|si, pˆ] = 1
τθ + τs + τpˆ
Substituting these expressions in investors’ demand functions, given by Eq. (7), we can write q1i as
∆q1i =
(
τθθ + τssi + τpˆ
(
αp
αs
p− ψαs
))
Var [θ|si, p]− p− γVar [θ|si, p] q0
γVar [θ|si, p] + c ,
where we define κ ≡ γVar [θ|si, p] + c. As in our benchmark model, matching coefficients with our initial guess in
Eq. (A.20), we are able to characterize αs, αp, and ψ as the solution to a system of equations. It is clear from Eq.
(A.21) that dτpˆdc is negative, because αp is a decreasing function of c, that is
dτpˆ
dc
< 0
Remark. The model with exogenously given noise trading demand spuriously concludes that high trading costs
decrease price informativeness and increase price volatility. It implicitly models the behavior of a group of investors
in the economy as if they were fully inelastic to trading costs.
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D Equilibrium without learning
For reference, we characterize as a benchmark the equilibrium of the competitive economy when there is no
learning. To ease the notation, we use Ei [θ] for E [θ|si] and Vari [θ] for Vari [θ|si]. For reference, we derive market
clearing in the case without learning as follows:
ˆ
ωi∆qˆ1idi =
ˆ
ωi
(
Ei [θ]− γihi − p
γiVari [θ]
− q0i
)
di =
ˆ
Γi (Ei [θ]− γihi − p− γiVari [θ] q0i) di = 0,
where Γi = ωiγiVari[θ] =
1
γiVar[θ]+c and
´
Γidi =
´ 1
γiVari[θ]+cdi. We can write the equilibrium price as
p =
ˆ
gi (Ei [θ]− γihi − γiVari [θ] q0i) di,
where gi = Γi´ Γidi =
1
γiVari[θ]+c´ 1
γiVari[θ]+c
di
. gi is the contribution of investor i to the harmonic average of demand
sensitivities. When γi = γ, we can write gi =
1
γVari[θ]+c´ 1
γVari[θ]+c
di
= 1. In the general case,
dp
dc
=
ˆ
dgi
dc
(Ei [θ]− γihi − γiVari [θ] q0i) di,
where
dgi
dc
= 1
γiVari [θ] + c
− 1γiVari[θ]+c
´ 1
γiVari[θ]+cdi+
´ 1
(γiVari[θ]+c)2 di(´ 1
γiVari[θ]+cdi
)2
So dgidc R 0 if
´ 1
(γiVari[θ]+c)2 di R
1
γiVari[θ]+c
´ 1
γiVari[θ]+cdi. Note thatˆ
dgi
dc
di = 0
So we can write
dp
dc
= Covi
[
dgi
dc
,Ei [θ]− γihi − γiVari [θ] q0i
]
Therefore, the price goes up or down when c increases depending on the cross-sectional covariance of dgidc , which
captures the change induces in demand elasticities, with Ei [θ]− γihi− γiVari [θ] q0i, which captures the desire for
trading unrelated to prices. The main takeaway of this analysis is the following.
Remark. In the model without learning, the equilibrium price is independent of the level of trading costs as long
as γiVari [θ] is constant.
E Welfare of external investor and price informativeness
The choice of price informativeness as the variable of interest is justified by the fact that it corresponds to the
welfare of an external investor who must make a choice based on its expectation about θ.
Formally, assume that there exists an external investor who solves
min
x
E
[
(x− θ)2
∣∣∣ I] ,
where I is the investor’s information set. We assume that the external investor has the same prior over θ as all
the other investors in our economy, and only observes the asset price p, so I = p. It is optimal for the external
investor to choose
x = E [θ| p] = τθθ + τ
e
pˆ pˆ
τθ + τepˆ
,
where pˆ and τepˆ are given in Eq. (A.3). The welfare W
(
τepˆ
)
of this external investor is given by
W
(
τepˆ
)
= −Var [θ| pˆ] = − 1
τθ + τepˆ
,
which is an increasing function of price informativeness.
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F Endogenous precision of the signal about the aggregate hedging
needs
We now explore the possibility that investors may acquire information about the aggregate hedging component –
the noise component of asset prices – and show that an increase in trading costs decreases the information acquired
about the aggregate hedging component in equilibrium.
To have a meaningful precision choice separate from investors’ hedging motives, we extend the benchmark
model with ex-ante identical investors by assuming that, in addition to the private signal about the fundamental,
investors receive a private signal about the aggregate hedging need given by
ηi = δ + εηi,
where
εηi ∼ N
(
0, τ−1ηi
)
and εηi is independent of all other random variables in the economy. Investors choose the precision of this signal
at a cost λη (τη), where λη (·) is continuous and twice differentiable and it satisfies, λ′η (·) > 0, λ′′η (·) ≥ 0 and the
Inada condition limτηi→∞ λ′η (τηi) =∞.
Equilibrium of the trading stage In a symmetric equilibrium in linear strategies of the trading stage, we
conjecture and verify that investors follow net trading demands given by
∆q1i = αssi − αhhi + αηηi − αpp+ ψ,
which imply an equilibrium price that takes the form
p = αs
αp
θ − αh − αη
αp
δ + ψ
αp
.
The unbiased signal contained in the price is pˆ = αpαs p−
ψ
αs
which, from an external observer’s point of view,
is distributed as follows.
pˆ|θ ∼ N
(
θ,
(
τepˆ
)−1)
, where τepˆ =
(
αs
αh − αη
)2
τδ. (A.22)
As in the model presented in Section 2, the relevant measure of price informativeness is τepˆ . As can be seen from
Eq. (A.22), price informativeness is higher the more sensitive investors are to their private signals, either about
the fundamental θ or about the aggregate hedging needs δ, and the less sensitive investors are to their own hedging
needs. Intuitively, the more weight investors put on their information, the higher the informational content of
prices.
Lemma 3. (Existence and multiplicity) An equilibrium of the trading stage always exists. There are at most
three equilibria.
The results from Lemma 3 follow from the cubic equation that characterizes αsαh−αη , which is analogous to
Eq. (15). In fact, from the analysis of Eq. (15) in the Appendix, it can be seen that the model analyzed here
has either one or three equilibria. Also, if there are multiple equilibria, only the higher and lower equilibria can
be made stable under plausible assumptions on equilibrium convergence. Finally, it can be seen that in the two
stable equilibria
∂
(
αs
αh−αη
)
∂τs
> 0 and
∂
(
αs
αh−αη
)
∂τη
> 0.
Intuitively, price informativeness always increases with the amount of information in the economy. This is true
regardless of whether the information is about the fundamental or about the aggregate hedging needs.
Investors’ information choice The equilibrium of the model with information acquisition about the
aggregate hedging need δ is defined analogously to the equilibrium of the model with information acquisition
about the fundamental θ. The equilibrium of both models with information acquisition takes into account the
equilibrium in linear strategies played in the trading stage. Since the equilibrium in the trading stage may not be
unique, the probability with which each equilibrium is played at date 1 is also an equilibrium outcome. Again, we
focus on equilibria with a degenerate distribution pi ∈ {0, 1} in what follows.
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Investors optimally choose τηi by solving
max
τηi
V
(
τηi; {τηj}j 6=i
)
, where V
(
τηi; {τηj}j 6=i
)
= E [vi]− λ (τηi) ,
and E [vi] is given by
E [vi] = Cov [(E [θ|si, hi, ηi, p]− γihi − p) , q∗1i]−
1
2 (γiVar [θ|si, hi, ηi, p] + c)E
[
(q∗1i)
2
]
.
The first order condition of this problem, formally given in the Appendix, is analogous Eq. (21) in the previous
subsection. The following lemma shows that there is an equilibrium in the information acquisition stage and that
all equilibria are symmetric.
Lemma 4. (Existence and symmetry of equilibrium) There always exists an equilibrium in the information
acquisition stage. Any equilibrium is symmetric.
The economic forces at play when investors acquire information about the aggregate hedging needs are
analogous to those that are present when investors acquire information about the fundamental. A higher precision
of the signal about the aggregate hedging needs increases the accuracy of the investor’s demand. A higher precision
τηi allows the investor to predict the amount of noise contained in the price better, effectively increasing the
informativeness of the price for the investor. When trading costs increase, the benefit of trading more accurately
decrease and so does the information acquired in equilibrium. Theorem 10 formalizes this argument.
Theorem 10. (Effect of trading costs with endogenous precision of the signal on the aggregate
hedging need) When investors are ex-ante identical, an increase in trading costs decreases the information
acquired about the fundamental in equilibrium, i.e.,
dτ∗ηi
dc
< 0.
In the two well-behaved equilibria, this reduction in information acquisition also generates a reduction in price
informativeness, hence dτ
e
pˆ
dc < 0.
As in the case in which investors can acquire information about the fundamental, an increase in transaction
costs decreases the amount of information acquired by investors and leads to a less informative price if investors
coordinate on the stable equilibria, as described in Eq. (16). Figure A.1 illustrates how the precision about the
aggregate hedging need and price informativeness in equilibrium change as a function of the level of trading cost
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Figure A.1: Equilibrium comparative statics
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F.1 Proofs
Consider the benchmark model with symmetric investors with the only difference that investors also receive a
private signal about the aggregate hedging need. More specifically, consider that
ηi = δ + εηi, where εηi ∼ N
(
0, τ−1ηi
)
.
and εηi is independent of all other random variables in the economy.
Also, before any information is revealed, we allow investors to choose the precision of this signal at a cost
λη (τηi), where λη (·) is continuous and twice differentiable and it satisfies, λ′η (·) > 0, λ′′η (·) ≥ 0 and the Inada
condition limτηi→∞ λ′η (τηi) =∞.
Then, in a symmetric equilibrium in linear strategies
∆q1i = αssi − αhhi + αηηi − αpp+ ψ,
where market clearing implies an equilibrium price
p = αs
αp
θ − αh − αη
αp
δ + ψ
αp
.
Then, the unbiased signal of θ contained in the price is pˆ = αpαs
(
p− ψαp
)
= θ − αh−αηαs δ. Solving the optimal
filtering problem from the perspective of investor i allows us to write
E [θ|hi, si, ηi, p] =
τθθ + τssi + τpˆi
(
pˆ+ αsαh−αη
τhhi+τηiηi
τpˆi
)
τθ + τs + τpˆi
and
Var [θ|hi, si, ηi, p] = 1
τθ + τsi + τpˆi
, where τpˆi =
(
αs
αh − αη
)2
(τδ + τh + τηi) .
The first order condition for the investors in the trading stage is
∆q∗1i =
E [θ|si, hi, ηi, p]− γihi − p
γiVar [θ|hi, si, ηi, p] + c .
In a symmetric equilibrium,
αs =
1
κ
τs
τθ + τs + τpˆ
, αh =
1
κ
(
γ − αs
αh − αη
τh
τθ + τs + τpˆ
)
,
αη =
1
κ
αs
αh − αη
τη
τθ + τs + τpˆ
, αp =
1
κ
τs
τs + τpˆ
, and ψ = αp
τθθ
τθ + τs + τpˆ
,
where αsαh−αη is given by the solution to
γ
(
αs
αh − αη
)3
(τδ + τh + τη)−
(
αs
αh − αη
)2
(τh + τη) + γ (τθ + τs)
αs
αh − αη − τs = 0.
Investors’ information choice An investor i chooses τηi to solve maxτhi E [vi]−λη (τhi) where E [vi] is given
by
E [vi] = E [(E [θ|si, hi, p]− γhi − p)]E [q∗1i] + Cov [(E [θ|si, hi, ηi, p]− γhi − p) , q∗1i]− 12 (γVar [θ|si, hi, p] + c)E
[
(q∗1i)2
]
=
(
θ − E [p]
)
E [q∗1i] + Cov [(E [θ|si, hi, ηi, p]− γhi − p) , q∗1i]− 12 (γVar [θ|si, hi, ηi, p] + c)E
[
(q∗1i)2
]
,
where we use the fact that E [(E [θ|si, hi, p]− γhi − p)] =
(
θ − E [p])E [q∗1i] = 0, given the assumption that q0i = 0.
The optimal precision choice τ∗ηi is given by the solution to Hˆ
(
τ∗ηi
)
= 0 where
Hˆ (τηi) =
1
2
∂Cov [(E [θ|si, hi, ηi, p]− γhi − p) , q∗1i]
∂τηi
− λ′η (τηi) .
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where we use that
∂Cov [(E [θ|si, hi, p]− γhi − p) , q∗1i]
∂τηi
= (γVar [θ|si, hi, p] + c) ∂Var [q
∗
1i]
∂τηi
− γ ∂Var [θ|si, hi, ηi, p]
∂τηi
Var [q∗1i] .
The second order condition of the information choice problem is given by
∂Hˆ (τηi)
∂τηi
= ∂
2Cov [(E [θ|si, hi, p]− γhi − p) , q∗1i]
∂τ2ηi
− λˆ′′ (τηi)
= −2 1
κi
(
αs
αh + αη
)2
Var [θ|si, hi, p]3 ∂Cov [E [θ|si, hi, p]− γhi − p, q
∗
1i]
∂τηi
c− λˆ′′ (τηi) < 0.
Equilibrium
Lemma 4. (Existence and symmetry of equilibrium)
Proof. The proof is analogous to the proof of Lemma 2, since for any given equilibrium of the trading game the
first order condition of the information acquisition game is
Hˆ
(
τ∗ηi
)
= 0,
where Hˆ (τηi) is continuous in τηi ∈ (0,∞), limτηi→0 Hˆ (τηi) =∞, and limτηi→∞ Hˆ (τηi) = −∞.
Theorem 10. (Effect of trading costs with endogenous precision of the signal on the
aggregate hedging need)
Proof. The implicit function theorem implies
∂τ∗ηi
∂c
= −
∂Hˆ(τηi)
∂c
∂Hˆ(τηi)
∂τηi
< 0,
because
∂Hˆ (τηi)
∂c
= −
γVar [θ|si, hi, p]2
(
αs
αh+αη
)2
κ2i
Cov [(E [θ|si, hi, p]− γhi − p) , q∗1i] + 1
κi
∂Cov [(E [θ|si, hi, p]− γhi − p) , q∗1i]
∂τηi
 < 0.
Since in any sunspot equilibria the first order condition is a linear combination of the first order condition
for the case in which each equilibria is played with probability one, the first result follows. The second
result follows directly from the fact that
∂
(
αs
αh−aη
)
∂τηi
> 0 in both stable equilibria.
G Dynamics
In this extension, we add an additional round of trading to capture dynamic trading considerations. Forward-
looking investors who buy and sell over time are more sensitive to the presence of trading costs, because they
anticipate facing trading costs twice. To tractably allow for multiple trading rounds within our framework, we
assume that investors start with asset holdings q−1, and have the opportunity to choose portfolios both at dates
0 and 1, as illustrated in Figure A.2.
Portfolio choice
q0i
Portfolio choice
q1i
Payoffs realized
θ1
Payoffs realized
θ2
t = 0 t = 1 t = 2
Figure A.2: Timeline dynamic model
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We further assume a) that investors maximize expected utility of consumption at the final date 2 and b) that
the risky asset pays dividends at dates 1 and 2, respectively denoted by θ1 and θ2. The structure of the model
at each date is identical to the one in the benchmark model with ex-ante identical investors, assuming that all
variables have i.i.d. realizations. To simplify the analysis, we focus on the case in which the sunspot equilibrium
at date 2 is degenerate if there are multiple equilibria.
In this environment, investors’ net worth at dates 1 and 2 are respectively are given by
w2i = n2i + q1iθ2 + w1i − q1ip− c2 (∆q1i)
2 and
w1i = n1i + q0i (θ1 + p1) + q−1p0 − q0ip0 − c2 (∆q0i)
2
.
The solution to the problem from date 1 onward is identical to our benchmark model.25 Hence, we focus our
attention on characterizing the equilibrium of the economy at date 0. Investor’s objective function at date 0
corresponds to
max
q0i
(E [θ1|s0i, h0i, p0]− γh1i) q0i − p0∆q0i − γ2E [θ1|s0i, h0i, p0] q
2
0i −
c
2 (∆q0i)
2 + E [p] q0i − c2 (q0i)
2
.︸ ︷︷ ︸
Forward-Looking Term
The investors’ objective function at date 0 incorporates a new term that accounts for the future benefits and costs
associated with risky asset holdings. The additional benefit from holding an additional unit of q0i is given by its
expected sale price at date 1. The additional cost is determined by the trading cost level c in a quadratic way.
The first order condition to the investors problem yields the following demand for the risky asset at date 0
q0i =
E [p] + E [θ1|s0i, h0i, p0]− γh0i − p0 − cq−1i
γE [θ1|s0i, h0i, p0] + 2c .
This expression is almost identical to the optimal demand at date 1, with the exception that now the level of
trading costs in the denominator is effectively doubled: because investors are forward-looking, they trade less in
the risky asset, because they internalize the effect of future trading costs when they have to further buy or sell
assets.
In the equilibrium in linear strategies that we study, we guess (and subsequently verify) that the optimal
portfolio of investor i takes the form
∆q0i = αs0si − αh0hi − αp0p+ ψ0,
where αs, αh, and αp are positive scalars and ψ can take any sign. As in our benchmark model, market clearing
implies that the equilibrium price takes the form
p0 =
αs0
αp0
θ1 − αh0
αp0
δ1 +
ψ0
αp0
,
We again defined by pˆ the unbiased signal of θ1 in equilibrium. Therefore, the relevant measure of price
informativeness in this context is given by τpˆ0, defined by
τpˆ0 =
(
αs0
αh0
)2
τδ1.
We can thus prove a new irrelevance theorem in the context of this dynamic model.
Theorem 11. (Irrelevance theorem in dynamic environment) In an economy in which investors trade at
multiple dates, when investors are ex-ante identical, price informativeness in any equilibrium is independent of the
level of trading costs. Formally, the precision of the unbiased signal about the fundamental revealed by the asset
price at every date τepˆt does not depend on c.
Theorem 11 shows that our irrelevance argument also applies when investors trade over time. As we have
shown, trading demands vary depending on investors’ trading horizons. In particular, it is well known that small
trading costs can have very large effects on trading volume when investors trade a high frequencies. However,
as long as the reduction in trading after a trading costs increase is symmetric across investors, both information
and hedging trading are reduced at the same rate, leaving price informativeness unchanged. Although, for clarity,
we derive our results in a two date model, it is straightforward to extend our result to multi-period dynamic
economies.
25Investors hold different levels of asset holdings at date 1. As shown in Section 3, the irrelevance result applies to that
case.
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G.1 Proofs
The wealth accumulation equations for investors at dates 1 and 2 are
w2i = n2i + q1iθ2 + w1i − q1ip1 − c2 (∆q1i)
2
w1i = n1i + q0i (θ1 + p1) + w0i − (∆q0i) p0 − c2 (∆q0i)
2
.
The indirect utility of investor i at date 1 is a function of his initial asset holdings q0i. Formally, we can write
V (q0i) as
V (q0i) = E [Ui (w2i) |s0i, h0i, p0] = −E
[
e−γw2i |s0i, h0i, p0
]
= −e−γ[E[w2i|s0i,h0i,p0]− γ2 Var[w2i|s0i,h0i,p0]].
Let E0i [·] ≡ E [·|s0i, h0i, p0], Var0i [·] ≡ Var [·|s0i, h0i, p0] and Cov0i [·] = Cov0i [·|s0i, h0i, p0]. Then, investor i’s
portfolio choice in period 0 can be written as
max
q0i
E0i [w2i]− γ2Var0i [w2i] ,
which can be written as
max (E0i [θ1 + p∗1]− p0) q0i − γh1iq0i −
c
2 (∆q0i)
2 − c2E0i
[
(∆q∗1i)
2
]
− γ2Var0i [θ1 + p
∗
1 + cq∗1i] q20i − γ (1 + c)Cov0i [n2i + q∗1i (θ2 − p1) , q∗1i] q0i.
The first order condition for this problem is
q∗0i =
E0i [θ1 + p∗1 + cq∗1i]− p0 + cq−1i − γh1i − γ (1 + c)Cov0i [n2i + q∗1i (θ2 − p1) , q∗1i]
γ (Var0i [θ1 + p∗1 + cq∗1i]) + 2c
.
In a symmetric equilibrium in linear strategies q∗0i = αs0s0i − αh0h0i − αp0p0 + ψ0, where
αs0 =
1
κ
τs0
τs0 + τθ0 + τpˆ0
, αh0 =
1
κ
(
γ − τpˆ0
αs0
αh0
τh0
τh0+τδ0
τs0 + τθ0 + τpˆ0
)
, αp0 =
1
κ
(
1− τpˆ0
τs0 + τθ0 + τpˆ0
)
, and
ψ0 =
1
κ
(
−τpˆ0 αp0αs0ψ0
τs0 + τθ0 + τpˆ0
+ E0i [p∗1 + cq∗1i] + cq−1i − γ (1 + c)Cov0i [n2i + q∗1i (θ2 − p1) , q∗1i]
)
,
where we define κ = γ (Var0i [θ1 + p∗1 + cq∗1i]) + 2c.
The measure of price informativeness is
τpˆ0 =
(
αs0
αh0
)2
(τδ0 + τh0) .
Theorem 11. (Irrelevance theorem in dynamic environment)
Proof. It is sufficient to show that αs0αh0 is independent of c, since we know from the benchmark model that
αs1
αh1
is
independent of c. αs0αh0 is the solution to the following system which is independent of c, thus, the proposition holds
αs0
αh0
=
τs0
τs0+τθ0+τpˆ0
γ − τpˆ0
αs0
αh0
τh0
τh0+τδ0
τs0+τθ0+τpˆ0
.
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